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ABSTRACT
If any area of constitutional law has been defined by a metaphor,
the First Amendment is the area, and the “marketplace of ideas” is the
metaphor. Ever since Justice Holmes invoked the concept in his
Abrams dissent, academic and popular understandings of the First
Amendment have embraced the notion that free speech, like the free
market, creates a competitive environment in which the best ideas
ultimately prevail. But as with the free market for goods and services,
there are discontents who point to the market failures that make the
marketplace metaphor aspirational at best, and inequitable at worst.
Defenders of the free economic market have responded to these
criticisms by developing a thicker understanding of how the market
actually functions. Their most successful model is the New
Institutional Economics, which incorporates and explains the
transaction costs and institutions that populate and effectively regulate
that market. The marketplace of ideas model, however, remains
faithfully wedded to a neoclassical view that depends on a perfectly
costless and efficient exchange of ideas. It is thus vulnerable to the
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same criticisms economists answered decades ago, and it fails to take
into account the rich view of market mechanisms and institutions they
have developed since. First Amendment scholars led by Frederick
Schauer have begun to lay the groundwork for a solution by
describing an “Institutional First Amendment” that would accord
special treatment to certain institutions like schools and the press.
But just as the marketplace of ideas fails to account for institutions,
the Institutional First Amendment fails to account for the marketplace
of ideas. As it turns out, the two theories are not only reconcilable but
complementary. This Article brings them together, using the New
Institutional Economics to describe the “speech institutions”—such as
schools and universities—that play the same cost-reducing role in the
marketplace of ideas as other institutions do in the market for goods
and services. Courts should defer to the speech rules of marketplaceof-ideas-enhancing institutions for the same reason and to the same
degree that economists defer to the private norms of marketenhancing institutions. The Article then tests the descriptive and
normative validity of this “New Institutional First Amendment,”
finding that it both explains and justifies much of the Court’s school
speech doctrine, including its 2007 ruling in Morse v. Frederick. It
also justifies the special status of universities as speech institutions,
and suggests an explanation for some of the current weaknesses in
commercial speech doctrine. By addressing the “economic”
objections to the marketplace metaphor, the Article attempts to better
describe, explain, and rehabilitate the marketplace of ideas.
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INTRODUCTION
In a single passage of his dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United
1
States, Justice Holmes—joined by Justice Brandeis—conceptualized
the purpose of free speech so powerfully that he revolutionized not
just First Amendment doctrine, but popular and academic

1.

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
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2
understandings of free speech. The metaphor he employed was the
3
“marketplace of ideas.” In Holmes’s words:

[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
4
Constitution.

Free speech, in Holmes’s framework, is worthy of constitutional
protection precisely because—like the free flow of goods and
services—it creates a competitive environment in which good ideas
flourish and bad ideas fail.5 This theory provided the first justification
for a broad freedom of expression commensurate with the sweeping
6
language of the First Amendment itself. Never before or since has a
Justice conceived a metaphor that has done so much to change the
way that courts, lawyers, and the public understand an entire area of

2. Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256,
1278 n.97 (2005) (suggesting that the popular view—though “crude” and not endorsed by
Schauer himself—is that “the First Amendment started in 1919” when Abrams was penned).
3. The phrase “marketplace of ideas” was not actually Holmes’s. Trade imperfections
being what they are, the marketplace of ideas has accorded Holmes credit for what was in fact
Justice Brennan’s turn of phrase. See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (“The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise
willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them. It would be a barren marketplace
of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.”); see also CBS v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 199 (1973) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting) (“I can only conclude that
there is simply no overriding First Amendment interest of broadcasters that can justify the
absolute exclusion of virtually all of our citizens from the most effective ‘marketplace of ideas’
ever devised.”).
4. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
5. R.H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 27 (1977) (“The
rationale of the First Amendment is that only if an idea is subject to competition in the
marketplace can it be discovered (through acceptance or rejection) whether it is false or not.”).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the Freedom of
Speech . . . .”); see Pnina Lahav, Holmes and Brandeis: Libertarian and Republican Justification
for Free Speech, 4 J.L. & POL. 451, 454 (1988) (“This dissent for the first time attached a theory
of freedom of expression to the language of the first amendment.”); see also Bruce C. Hafen,
Developing Student Expression Through Institutional Authority: Public Schools as Mediating
Structures, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 663, 704 n.206 (1987) (including Abrams among the cases that laid
the foundation for “today’s accepted free speech doctrine”).
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7
constitutional law. Its influence has been both descriptive and
normative, dominating the explanation of and the justification for
free speech in the United States.
But while First Amendment doctrine has carried Holmes’s
laissez-faire marketplace banner more or less faithfully since Abrams,
economic theory has not. Holmes’s metaphor describes the
marketplace as an atomistic place where individuals costlessly
compete to their mutual benefit.8 This simplistic view of the market

7. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 73 (1960) (arguing that
establishing truth through a marketplace of ideas “is not merely the ‘best’ test. There is no
other.”); William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment
Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995) (“In Speech Clause jurisprudence, for example, the oftrepeated metaphor that the First Amendment fosters a marketplace of ideas that allows truth to
ultimately prevail over falsity has been virtually canonized.”).
In an attempt to chart the degree to which “[t]he marketplace of ideas permeates the
Supreme Court’s first amendment jurisprudence,” Stanley Ingber listed the following cases, all
of them major landmarks in the doctrine:
Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866–67 (1982); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,
267 n.5 (1981); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295
(1981); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 537–38 (1980); FCC
v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745–46 (1978); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 760 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S.
809, 826 (1975); Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248 (1974); Red
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 382
(1967).
Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 n.2. The list
has grown since Ingber compiled it. See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003) (“Many
persons . . . will choose simply to abstain from protected speech . . . harming not only themselves
but society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.” (citation
omitted)); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998) (“[A] more pressing
constitutional question would arise if Government funding resulted in the imposition of a
disproportionate burden calculated to drive ‘certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.’”
(quoting Simon & Shuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
116 (1991))); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (discussing “[t]he dramatic expansion of
this new marketplace of ideas”); 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 496 (1996)
(“[W]e held that it was error to assume that commercial speech was entitled to no First
Amendment protection or that it was without value in the marketplace of ideas.” (citing
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975))); Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 116 (“[T]he
government’s ability to impose content-based burdens on speech raises the specter that the
government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.” (citing
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448–49 (1991))).
8. Describing the legal ideology that guided Holmes’s dissent, Pnina Lahav has explained
that “[s]ociety, in turn, was conceived not as organic but rather as atomistic—made of many
autonomous individuals.” Lahav, supra note 6, at 455; see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, First
Amendment Intermediaries in the Age of Cyberspace, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1653, 1653 (1998)
(“Despite its frequent individualist rhetoric—including depictions of lone speakers on
soapboxes and of buyers and sellers in a marketplace of ideas—First Amendment law must
regularly take account of organizations engaged in speech activity that stand somewhere
between the individual and the state.”). The First Amendment has also come to be associated
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has fallen out of favor with economists, who realized long ago what
critics of the marketplace of ideas metaphor have argued: The market
is an imperfect and frequently malfunctioning machine, and the costs
of exchange add friction to its gears. This friction, which economists
call “transaction costs,” includes the time and expenditure needed to
find, evaluate, and obtain good ideas or products.9 And although
Holmes’s metaphor does not account for them, these costs exist in the
marketplace of ideas just as surely as they do in the economic market.
But rather than defending a view of the idealized, neoclassical
market—as Holmes’s supporters have—economists responded by
creating a new model, one that accounts for transaction costs. Led by
10
11
12
Ronald Coase, Douglass North, and Oliver Williamson, among
13
others, many economists have embraced a richer understanding of

not just with an atomistic marketplace of ideas, but with support for individual rights and a
profound distrust of social institutions. Bruce C. Hafen, Comment, Hazelwood School District
and the Role of First Amendment Institutions, 1988 DUKE L.J. 685, 686; Stanley Ingber,
Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The First Amendment in Institutional
Context, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5 (1990).
9. R.H. COASE, The Problem of Social Cost, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW
95, 114 (1988).
10. See generally Ronald Coase, The New Institutional Economics, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 72,
72 (1998) (“It is commonly said, and it may be true, that the new institutional economics started
with my article, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) with its explicit introduction of transaction costs
into economic analysis.”).
11. See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3 (1990) (analyzing how institutions contribute to long-term
economic performance and providing a “framework to integrate institutional analysis into
economics and economic history”).
12. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock,
Looking Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LIT. 595, 601 (2000) (discussing the development of the New
Institutional Economics and proposing the “remediableness criterion” as an alternative
formulation of efficiency under which “an extant mode of organization for which no superior
feasible alternative can be described and implemented with expected net gains is presumed to be
efficient”).
13. See generally THRÁINN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 6–7
(1990) (construing the Neoinstitutional Economics approach under which certain neoclassical
assumptions are relaxed, and distinguishing this approach from New Institutional Economics,
under which certain neoclassical assumptions are rejected); THE FRONTIERS OF THE NEW
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (John N. Drobak & John V.C. Nye eds., 1997) (compiling a series
of articles by scholars of New Institutional Economics, including John V.C. Nye and John N.
Drobak, written for a conference held at Washington University in March 1995 to mark
Douglass North’s win of the 1993 Nobel Prize in Economics); THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL
ECONOMICS AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT (John Harris et al. eds., 1995) (compiling a
series of articles by scholars of New Institutional Economics, including John Toye and Robert
H. Bates, written for a conference organized by the Third World Economic History and
Development Group to analyze the movement’s application to development economics).
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the institutions—not just individuals—that make the market economy
work. Though diverse in their interests and approaches, these
economists gather under the flag of the New Institutional Economics
(NIE), which has become a preferred framework for analyzing
14
economic development. NIE analysis focuses not just on individuals’
attempts to maximize their own utility in an idealized market—the
Holmesian view of the marketplace—but also on understanding how
transaction costs make the market malfunction, and how institutions
help or hinder individuals’ attempts to overcome those costs.15
Bolstered by empirical and social science evidence, NIE scholars have
argued persuasively that many institutions lower the costs of
exchange, and that such institutions should be entitled to deference
from would-be regulators.
Meanwhile, as part of a revival of interest in institutional context
16
in constitutional law, First Amendment scholarship has taken an
interest in institutions as well, albeit without reference to institutional
economics. Some First Amendment scholars—most notably and most
successfully Frederick Schauer17—have begun to sketch the contours
of an “Institutional First Amendment” that would be better attuned
to certain speech-enhancing social institutions. Under Schauer’s

14. Philip M. Nichols, A Legal Theory of Emerging Economies, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 229, 239
(1999) (“Across the variety of social sciences, the theoretical approach that possibly has the
most currency is institutionalism.”).
15. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, 111 Yale L.J. 357, 375 (2001) (noting that the New Institutional Economics “is
united by its concern with transaction costs in understanding economic phenomena”).
16. See generally Symposium, Constitutional “Niches”: The Role of Institutional Context in
Constitutional Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1463 (2007) (collecting articles addressing educational
institutions, the institutions of federalism, national security institutions, and the workplace).
Legal scholars often use the word “institution” to refer to large categories such as the market,
courts, or the legislature. See, e.g., NEAL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3 (1994) (focusing on how society
allocates governance authority across the political process, the market, and courts); ADRIAN
VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT SMALL (2007)
(describing how law can promote democratic institutions); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian
Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 888 (2003) (arguing for greater
attention to the respective interpretive capacities of courts and the legislature); see also Mark D.
Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
1513, 1516 (2005) (arguing that constitutional principles should apply differently to federal,
state, and local governments, rather than a one-size-fits-all approach).
17. See Schauer, supra note 2, at 1259–60 (arguing that as institutional differentiation
advances, First Amendment doctrine should develop a capacity to distinguish among
institutions).
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18
approach, courts should (and arguably do ) accord First Amendment
protection to institutions depending on the degree to which those
institutions serve important First Amendment values.19 Thus,
institutions that advance the First Amendment’s underlying values
are entitled to some deference when engaging in speech conduct.
Schools and the institutional press, for example, might be given
increased speech protection as compared to prisons or the military.
But just as the marketplace of ideas lacks an understanding of
institutions, the Institutional First Amendment lacks an
understanding of the marketplace. The institutional approach draws
its strength from a nuanced approach to the role of institutions, not
just individuals, in free speech. It offers a rich understanding of
institutions, but fails to account for the marketplace metaphor that
has guided free speech analysis for nearly a century. As a result, the
Institutional First Amendment is largely divorced from the dominant
First Amendment framework.
Considered in tandem, however, the institutional and
marketplace conceptions of the First Amendment provide a holistic
descriptive and normative conception of the practice and purpose of
free speech, one that rehabilitates Holmes’s doctrine-changing
metaphor and simultaneously incorporates a richer view of the
marketplace and the institutions that make it work. This Article
brings the theories together.
Part I begins by revisiting Holmes’s conception of the
marketplace of ideas, describing its power and influence and the
understanding of the market on which it relies. The second Section of
Part I then demonstrates how the economic understanding of the
“marketplace” has evolved since Holmes invoked it, thanks largely to
the contributions of the New Institutional Economics.
Part II advances a new theory of the First Amendment—the New
Institutional First Amendment—which integrates Justice Holmes’s
marketplace metaphor with the lessons of institutional economics.
This theory justifies the special treatment of certain speech
institutions, and does so by reference to the marketplace metaphor
that has guided First Amendment theory and jurisprudence for

18. See Scott A. Moss, Prisoners and Students and Workers—Oh, My! A Cautionary Note
About Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1635,
1639 (2007) (arguing that courts are overly sensitive to tailoring when it comes to certain
institutions such as prisons and schools).
19. Schauer, supra note 2, at 1270.
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almost a century. It argues that “speech institutions” deserve
deference by lawmakers because, and only to the extent that, they
improve the marketplace of ideas. It is this principle—use of the
marketplace metaphor to separate good speech institutions from
bad—that separates the “New” Institutional First Amendment
approach from that advocated by Professor Schauer. Part II begins by
describing Schauer’s Institutional First Amendment, then carries
Schauer’s theory forward by joining it with the insights of the New
Institutional Economics. The final Sections of Part II suggest ways to
identify and encourage market-enhancing speech institutions, again
drawing on the lessons of NIE.
Part III then tests the descriptive accuracy of the New
Institutional First Amendment theory by applying it to the Supreme
Court’s treatment of First Amendment claims involving schools and
universities, two of the most important speech institutions. Measured
against the Court’s institutional free speech jurisprudence, including
20
its 2007 decision in Morse v. Frederick, the New Institutional First
Amendment performs well as a descriptive and analytic tool. The
theory also helps explain—although cannot fully resolve—many of
the problems with contemporary commercial speech doctrine.
I. THE MARKETPLACE OF
IDEAS AND NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
A. The Marketplace of Ideas
Holmes’s invocation of the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor,
though it came in a dissent, has had as major an impact as any
Supreme Court decision on popular and academic thinking about the
First Amendment. Indeed, “[i]t is almost impossible to overstate the
importance of Justice Holmes’s dissent in shaping American law and
society.”21
Scholars and commentators have generally conceptualized the
metaphor as invoking the perfect competition of an idealized
neoclassical free market. Bad ideas should be no more feared than
bad products or services; they will simply lose out to better

20. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
21. Note, The Impermeable Life: Unsolicited Communications in the Marketplace of Ideas,
118 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1314 (2005).

01__BLOCHER.DOC

830

4/16/2008 8:29:05 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:821

22
competitors, so long as all are freely available. As John Milton—
23
whose Areopagitica was an intellectual predecessor to Holmes’s
Abrams dissent24—wrote, in a style only slightly more literary than
Holmes’s, “Let [truth] and falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth
25
put to the worse in a free and open encounter?” In Holmes and
Milton’s view, the “truth” should emerge from the free and
26
competitive exchange of ideas.
Soon after its initial appearance in 1919, the marketplace
metaphor came to dominate the Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence. In 1927, Justice Brandeis—who had joined Holmes’s
Abrams dissent—revisited and re-endorsed the marketplace
metaphor from a slightly different angle. Concurring in Whitney v.
27
California, Brandeis wrote that “freedom to think as you will and to
speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and

22. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 115 (1990) (praising
a “Darwinian test” for ideas as producing better results than a “centrally managed” economy);
Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic Market Place, 7 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8 (1964) (“The
traditional defense of the free market as a method of organizing economic life has been
utilitarian or instrumental. . . . The traditional defense of the free market in ideas has in the
main also been utilitarian.”).
23. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED
PRINTING (H.B. Cotterill ed., MacMillan & Co. 1959) (1644).
24. Areopagitica has spawned a rich literature as well, frequently as a sibling to Holmes’s
Abrams dissent and John Stuart Mill’s theory that human ideas and opinions prove themselves
only when challenged and only over time. See JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, reprinted in THE
SIX GREAT HUMANISTIC ESSAYS OF JOHN STUART MILL 143 (Albert William Levi ed.,
Washington Square Press 1963) (1859) (“Yet it is evidence in itself . . . that ages are no more
infallible than individuals; every age having held many opinions which subsequent ages have
deemed not only false but absurd; and it is as certain that many opinions, now general, will be
rejected by future ages, as it is that many, once general, are rejected by the present.”); see also
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 509 (1941) (grouping Holmes
with Mill and Milton as leading opponents of censorship in favor of open discussion).
25. MILTON, supra note 23, at 45. Thomas Jefferson expressed similar sentiments:
[T]ruth is great and will prevail, if left to herself; . . . she is the proper and sufficient
antagonist to error, and has nothing to fear from the conflict unless by human
interposition disarmed of her natural weapons, free argument and debate; errors
ceasing to be dangerous when it is permitted freely to contradict them.
Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, reprinted in 2 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 545, 546 (Julian P. Boyd ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1950)
26. Other scholars, pursuing a slightly more nuanced view of the marketplace, have argued
that the “value that is to be realized is not in the possible attainment of truth, but rather, in the
existential value of the search itself.” Marshall, supra note 7, at 4. But see Frederick Schauer,
Reflections on the Value of Truth, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 699, 724 (1991) (arguing that the
search for truth has no intrinsic value).
27. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
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28
spread of political truth,” and that in the case of bad ideas or
falsehoods, “the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence. Only an emergency can justify repression.”29 Brandeis’s
conception of the First Amendment has been described as depending
on the pursuit of self-rule, or self-fulfillment, or civic virtue, rather
than simply truth.30 But whether justified in terms of truth or virtue,
the marketplace was the animating metaphor for both Holmes and
Brandeis. Since 1919, when Abrams was decided, in a variety of
majority,31 concurring,32 and dissenting33 opinions, Justices have
repeatedly returned to Holmes’s basic idea that “[h]owever
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on
the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other
34
ideas.”
For all of its power, the marketplace of ideas metaphor also has
explanatory weaknesses and normative difficulties, almost all of
which track the shortcomings of its idealized view of an uninhibited,
35
costless, and perfectly efficient free market. Although this idealized
36
conception of the marketplace may have held sway in 1919,
economists have long since realized that the “neoclassical” view,
though useful as an analytic tool, is far from descriptively accurate. In
Professor Coase’s estimation, the neoclassical approach “is a view
disdainful of what happens in the real world, but it is one to which

28. Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 377.
30. Lahav, supra note 6, at 453.
31. See cases cited supra note 7.
32. E.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 265 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“The very ‘purpose of the First Amendment [is] to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969))).
33. E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 584 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“When
ideas compete in the market for acceptance, full and free discussion exposes the false and they
gain few adherents. . . . Full and free discussion has indeed been the first article of our faith.”);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that an idea
“offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or
some failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth”).
34. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974).
35. See Ingber, supra note 7, at 16–17 (“[T]he marketplace of ideas is as flawed as the
economic market.”).
36. Professor Coase’s The Nature of the Firm is credited with introducing the concept of
transaction costs and thus exposing the flawed assumptions underlying the neoclassical model. It
did not appear until 1937. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386
(1937).

01__BLOCHER.DOC

832

4/16/2008 8:29:05 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:821

[neoclassical] economists have become accustomed, and they live in
37
their world without discomfort.” So it is with the “marketplace of
ideas” conception. As Paul Brietzke puts it, both models ignore
a host of factors that make us human, including altruism, habit,
bigotry, panic, genius, luck or its absence, and factors such as peer
pressures, institutions, and cultures that turn us into social animals.
A dehumanized, desocialized, and often sexist ‘economic man’ [or
‘speech man’] supposedly goes through life as if it were one long
series of analogies to isolated transactions on the New York Stock
38
Exchange.

Professor Brietzke and other critics of the marketplace of ideas
metaphor have frequently drawn parallels between failures in the
39
real-world market and failures in the marketplace of ideas. Perhaps
the most frequently identified failures are those caused by resource
40
inequalities and disparities in communicative power and ability. The
marketplace of ideas, these critics argue, is likely to reflect and justify

37. Coase, supra note 10, at 72.
38. Paul H. Brietzke, How and Why the Marketplace of Ideas Fails, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 951,
962–63 (1997) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
39. See, e.g., Ingber, supra note 7, at 49–55. Whereas failures in the real world marketplace
have been used to justify state intervention in the market, failures in the marketplace of ideas
are generally used to criticize the theory and to argue that some other justification for free
speech should be pursued in its stead. Economists have noted this unequal treatment with
frustration. See Coase, supra note 5, at 4 (discussing the dichotomy between the assumptions of
the marketplace of ideas and those of the traditional marketplace); Director, supra note 22, at 6
(arguing that the distinction between the marketplace of ideas and the economic marketplace is
incorrect).
40. The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted in its campaign finance jurisprudence that
resource disparities can threaten the marketplace of political ideas. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich.
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659–60 (1990) (finding that the government has a
compelling interest in preventing corporations from using their resources “to obtain ‘an unfair
advantage in the political marketplace’” (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S.
238, 257 (1986))); see also CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 77–78 (1993) (arguing
that First Amendment doctrine, even when it nominally protects the marketplace of ideas, has
not “guaranteed free and equal speech” because of imbalances in speakers’ power); Derek E.
Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communications, and the Fallacy of the
Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 649, 673–96 (2006) (describing perceptual biases that
complicate the acquisition and processing of information); Darren Bush, The “Marketplace of
Ideas”: Is Judge Posner Chasing Don Quixote’s Windmills?, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 1114–16
(2000) (noting the possibility of monopolies in the marketplace of ideas).
Similar arguments could be made—though they rarely are—about the ability of listeners
to absorb and comprehend speech. Critics of the marketplace of ideas tend to focus on the
ability of speakers to dominate, and regard a speaker’s inability to effectively express a
viewpoint as a harm to the speaker, rather than to the listener who cannot hear or understand
the viewpoint. A rich view of the market should consider both harms.
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the positions of powerful speakers, rather than the merit or “truth” of
the ideas they express. A related criticism suggests that even if the
expression of ideas could be equalized, perhaps through government
41
action, the efficiency of the marketplace of ideas would still be
strictly limited by participants’ imperfect ability to reason.42 And even
if people could reason perfectly, the market still might not function as
Holmes envisioned, so long as their preferences are too unstable to
permit the pursuit of a single “truth.”43 Competition in such an
imperfect marketplace of ideas will not lead to ideal results, critics
allege, so long as the participants disagree about what good ideas are,
or cannot identify good ideas when they see them. Just as economists
argue that regulation of real-world markets is desirable when and
only when the market fails—because of fraud or monopoly, for
example—proponents of the marketplace of ideas theory can argue
that regulations of speech are permissible only when there are market
failures in the marketplace of ideas.44 As in the economic market,
such failures are likely to occur when circumstances make open
competition impossible.
Although generally avoiding the rhetoric of “market failure,” the
Supreme Court has long been attuned to the possibility of certain
speech-related market failures, such as the “emergency” situation to
which Justice Brandeis alluded in Whitney. One easy example—also a
brainchild of Justice Holmes and also born in 1919—is the clear and

41. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 16 (1993)
(arguing for a “New Deal for speech”). Daniel Farber has also used the market failure argument
to suggest greater government involvement in speech, arguing that speech may be an
underproduced public good that the government should, if anything, subsidize. Daniel A.
Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 554, 558–61 (1991).
42. For an explanation of this objection as applied to the marketplace of ideas, see Alvin I.
Goldman & James C. Cox, Speech, Truth, and the Free Market for Ideas, 2 LEGAL THEORY 1, 9
(1996) (explaining the criticism but not endorsing it). Behavioral economics, with its recognition
of the mental biases that can interfere with accurate information processing, is an important
source on this point. See generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1473 (1998) (describing a
“more accurate conception of choice” based on actual human behavior and relating this
behavior to prescriptive and normative ideas about the law).
43. Goldman & Cox, supra note 42, at 9 (explaining but disclaiming the notion that the
“mutability of beliefs undercuts objective truth”).
44. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 592–94
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 12-19, at 946 (2d ed. 1988) (“[G]overnment, while it may not close the market, may move to
correct its defects and regulate its incidental consequences.”).
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45
present danger test announced in Schenck v. United States. The
Schenck test denies constitutional protection to speech that creates a
“clear and present danger that it will bring about the substantive evils
46
that Congress has a right to prevent.” Fifty years later, Brandenburg
47
v. Ohio refined that test, holding that the First Amendment protects
even subversive speech unless that speech is intended to produce, and
48
is likely to produce, imminent serious violence. The mob scenes
contemplated in Brandenburg, like the clearly and presently
dangerous situations described in Schenck, represent a kind of market
failure. When hateful or provocative speech is delivered to an angry
and potentially violent group of listeners, realistically there is little
room for “good ideas”—such as pleas for calm or peace—to win out.
Even if the provocative speech is “true,” and violence warranted, it
will prevail not on its merits but because it has faced no true
competition. In such emergency situations, the usual costs of
communication—the cost and time needed to consider other
messages, for example—become prohibitive because of the threat of
immediate violence. This makes market failures likely and the cost of
such failures high.
Other free speech “exceptions” can also be explained as failures
in the marketplace of ideas. Writing for the majority in FEC v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,49 Justice Brennan cited Abrams
and noted that its “market metaphor has guided congressional
50
regulation in the area of campaign activity.” Invoking the concept of
“[p]olitical ‘free trade,’” Justice Brennan noted that “[d]irect
corporate spending on political activity raises the prospect that
resources amassed in the economic marketplace may be used to
provide an unfair advantage in the political marketplace.”51 Of course,
the precise degree to which Congress can constitutionally address that

45. Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); see also Ingber, supra note 7, at 17–22
(describing the clear and present danger test as related to the failures of the marketplace of
ideas).
46. Schenk, 249 U.S. at 52.
47. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 447 (1969) (per curiam).
48. Id. at 447–48.
49. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259 (1986) (holding that the Federal
Election Campaign Act was unconstitutional as applied to a nonprofit group, in part because—
unlike a for-profit corporation—the nonprofit group “was formed to disseminate political ideas,
not to amass capital. The resources it has available are not a function of its success in the
economic marketplace, but its popularity in the political marketplace.”).
50. Id. at 257 & n.10.
51. Id. at 257.
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fair trade remains a hotly contested issue whose ultimate resolution is
52
53
anything but clear. “Fighting words” doctrine and hate speech also
find themselves grouped into the “market failure” category; they
54
arguably cause harms that cannot be remedied by more speech.
Because hate speech disempowers those at whom it is directed, the
argument goes, anti-hate and anti-fighting speech has no real chance
55
to “compete.” The Court has endorsed other exceptions to the
marketplace of ideas based on the supposed failure of certain kinds of
speech to advance it. In Miller v. California,56 for example, the Court
declared that comparing the exchange of political ideas “with
commercial exploitation of obscene material demeans the grand
conception of the First Amendment.”57 Miller explicitly denied
obscenity any First Amendment protection for the same reason that
fighting words receive none: “such utterances are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”58 The Court
thus found that obscenity has no place in the market, and that it may
be regulated by reference to social institutions like order and
morality.59

52. In FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007), a majority of Justices
agreed that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) unconstitutionally forbade
certain issue advertisements, but could not agree as to why. See id. at 2673 (opinion of Roberts,
C.J., joined by Alito, J.) (finding that the BCRA was unconstitutional as applied because the
campaign ads were not “express advocacy or its functional equivalent”); id. at 2675, 2686
(Scalia, J., joined by Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (stating that the test for reviewing as-applied challenges to the relevant section of the
BCRA was unconstitutionally unclear, and that therefore the statute should not be enforced).
53. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
54. See Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets,
and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 177 (1982); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 n.9 (1974) (“[A]n opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo the
harm of defamatory falsehood.”).
55. See Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision,
85 NW. U. L. REV. 343, 385–86 (1991) (arguing that racist speech distorts discourse by
disempowering minority rebuttal, “a result at odds, certainly, with marketplace theories of the
first amendment”).
56. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
57. Id. at 34; see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (“[I]mplicit in the
history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social
importance.”).
58. Miller, 413 U.S. at 20–21 (quoting Chaplinksy, 315 U.S. at 571–72); see also Roth, 354
U.S. at 485 (same).
59. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
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Despite the power of the market failure critique, and
notwithstanding the exceptions announced in Schenck, Brandenburg,
Miller, and other cases, the Court continues to invoke the
marketplace of ideas metaphor as generally justifying broad speech
60
protections, not limitations. Thus although market failure rhetoric
has often been employed to justify government involvement in the
real-world market, it has not had a similar impact on First
Amendment doctrine or theory. This differential treatment is as old
as the marketplace of ideas metaphor. As many critics have pointed
out, Holmes himself was no staunch defender of the laissez-faire
economic market,61 and the Court has generally followed his lead by
treating the two markets differently. Justice Douglas, in Beauharnais
62
v. Illinois, made the point explicitly: “Free speech, free press, free
exercise of religion are placed separate and apart; they are above and
beyond the police power; they are not subject to regulation in the
manner of factories, slums, apartment houses, production of oil, and
the like.”63
Courts have clung to an idealized, neoclassical view of the
marketplace of ideas far more tenaciously than economists have, or
than courts themselves have, when it comes to the “real-world”
market. As Ronald Coase, Aaron Director, and other economists
have pointed out, the marketplace of ideas is far more free from state
regulation than the economic marketplace, despite the acknowledged

60. See cases cited supra note 7.
61. Ingber, supra note 7, at 5 n.14 (comparing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), with Holmes’s dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75
(1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets,
42 UCLA L. REV. 949, 949 (1995) (“Now contrast Holmes with—well, Holmes. . . . Government
attempts at regulating free trade in labor were permissible; government attempts at regulating
free trade of ideas were not.”).
62. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
63. Id. at 286 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Black, who was famous for his dogged
commitment to an absolutist First Amendment, was untroubled by government regulation of
the economic marketplace. Compare Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J.,
concurring) (“I read ‘no law . . . abridging’ to mean no law abridging.”) (alteration in original),
with Cities Serv. Co. v. Peerless Co., 340 U.S. 179, 189 (1950) (Black, J., concurring) (stating that
“the alleged federal constitutional questions are frivolous” when it comes to federal regulation
of natural gas prices). But because Justice Black’s reading of the First Amendment was based
more on his reading of the words of the First Amendment and less on support for the
“marketplace of ideas” metaphor, the comparison to Holmes is more interesting than fair.
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64
market failures in both. Frustrated by this unequal treatment, Coase
and Director have criticized “intellectuals [who] have shown a
tendency to exalt the market for ideas and to depreciate the market
65
for goods.” This inequality, Coase has argued, is utterly indefensible,
particularly because the market of ideas is no more important—and,
for most people, quite a bit less important—than the market for
goods, and is not necessarily any more entitled to freedom from
government regulation.66 Director, also a leading figure in the
Chicago School of Economics, argued the same thing a decade
67
earlier, but with a similarly negligible impact.
Criticisms of the idealized neoclassical market have thus had a
very different impact on economics than on First Amendment
doctrine. As far as the latter is concerned, the deconstruction of the
68
marketplace of ideas as a “legitimizing myth” has not yet given rise
to an improved economic metaphor. Scholars and courts continue to
see the marketplace of ideas in neoclassical terms, debating its merits
as if the only alternative would be to adopt a theory of the First
69
Amendment based on the value of speech to democracy, or the

64. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 5, at 2; R.H. Coase, The Market for Goods and the Market
for Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 384, 385 (1964) [hereinafter Coase, The Market for Goods];
Director, supra note 22, at 8.
65. Coase, The Market for Goods, supra note 64, at 385; see also Director, supra note 22, at
9 (“[P]roponents of the priority of the market place for ideas. . . . must of necessity rely on
exhortation and on the fragile support of self-denying ordinances in constitutions.”).
66. Coase, supra note 5, at 4 (“There is simply no reason to suppose that for the great mass
of people the market for ideas is more important than the market for goods. But even if the
market for ideas were more important, it does not follow that the two markets should be treated
differently.”).
67. Director, supra note 22, at 6 (“[For] the bulk of mankind . . . freedom of choice as
owners of resources in choosing within available and continually changing opportunities, areas
of employment, investment, and consumption is fully as important as freedom of discussion and
participation in government.”). See generally Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the
Politics of Distrust, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 41 (1992) (arguing the distrust directed toward the
government in speech regulation should apply with equal force in regulation of property rights).
68. See generally Ingber, supra note 7 (discussing the marketplace of ideas as a
“legitimizing myth”).
69. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587–88 (1980)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he First Amendment . . . has a structural role to play in securing
and fostering our republican system of self-government. . . . The structural model links the First
Amendment to that process of communication necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus
entails solicitude not only for communication itself, but also for the indispensable conditions of
meaningful communication.”); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATIONSHIP TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 88 (1948) (arguing that Holmes’s individualistic
marketplace theory of free speech misses the true purpose of the First Amendment, which is to
protect the public freedom necessary for self-government); SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 22–
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70
intrinsic value of speech to self-realization, or some other non“economic” value. Economists, however, have responded to the
deconstruction of the neoclassical economic model by replacing it
with more nuanced competitors, including most notably the New
Institutional Economics.

B. New Institutional Economics
Holmes’s marketplace metaphor invokes a place where
individuals (speakers) trade goods and services (ideas) in a
competitive environment where the good ideas are destined to beat
out the bad. It is, in essence, a neoclassical view of the economy. But
since at least the 1930s, economists—led by Nobel laureates Ronald
Coase and Douglass North, and also by Oliver Williamson, who
coined the term New Institutional Economics71—have increasingly
abandoned that neoclassical view in favor of a thickened
understanding of the market. Far from being a place where
individuals costlessly and perfectly pursue their self-interest, the
marketplace turns out to be populated with institutions that
regularize interactions and lower transaction costs. NIE scholars have
argued persuasively that many of these institutions improve the
market more than government regulation would, and that such
institutions (and their internal norms) should thus receive substantial
deference from the government.
1. Transaction Costs and Institutions. In the neoclassical view of
the market, self-interested individuals work to perfectly maximize
their happiness through a series of costless transactions. This is the
view of the economy familiar to many economics students. But in
Professor Coase’s blunt assessment, “[The neoclassical economy]
lives in the minds of economists but not on earth.”72
Coase’s key insight, which destroyed the practical applicability of
the neoclassical model and spurred the growth of the NIE, was the

23 (arguing that Madisonian ideas of democracy, rather than free market principles, should
shape First Amendment theory).
70. Lawrence Byard Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54, 79–81 (1988) (describing and criticizing
this argument).
71. Coase, supra note 10, at 72 (crediting Williamson).
72. R.H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 714
(1992).
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realization that the gears of the economic machine are not free from
friction. Any time people transact, they must pay not only the price of
the goods or services exchanged, but also the price of finding the
good in the first place, evaluating its worth, and so on. This process
costs time, energy, and money. Economists have dubbed these
expenses “transaction costs”—the costs of measuring resources or
claims, understanding and utilizing rights, and negotiating and
enforcing transactions.73 Coase—who has acknowledged, though not
exactly claimed, paternity of NIE74—divided transaction costs into
75
four categories: search, information, negotiation, and enforcement.
Contrary to the neoclassical model’s assumptions of perfect
information and costless exchange, Coase recognized that these costs
distort the market, making the mathematical predictions of
neoclassical models largely inapplicable in the real world. Every
transaction cost, he realized, is a small market failure.
But rather than simply pointing out that transaction costs create
market failures, as critics of the marketplace of ideas metaphor have
essentially done, NIE scholars took the additional step of
incorporating those costs into a new economic model. In doing so,
they connected theoretical neoclassical economics with the insights of
empirical social sciences. In his Nobel Prize acceptance speech,
Professor North sketched the general structure of the NIE: “The
analytical framework is a modification of neo-classical theory. What it
retains is the fundamental assumption of scarcity and hence
competition and the analytical tools of micro-economic theory. What
it modifies is the rationality assumption. What it adds is the
dimension of time.”76 The NIE thus preserves the market metaphor,
73. See EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC
THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 40 (1997).
74. Coase, supra note 10, at 72 (“It is commonly said, and it may be true, that the new
institutional economics started with my article, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) with its explicit
introduction of transaction costs into economic analysis.” (referencing Coase, The Nature of the
Firm, supra note 36)).
75. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, supra note 36, at 390–92. Ironically, the theorem that
bears Coase’s name suggests just the opposite—that, so long as property rights are well-defined,
individuals will always negotiate their way to an optimal allocation of resources, no matter how
those resources are initially allocated. Coase himself pointed out—repeatedly and to no avail—
that this theorem did not represent his view of the real-world market, and that in fact the
existence of transactions costs rendered it little more than a thought experiment. See Coase,
supra note 72, at 714.
76. Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 359,
359 (1994) (reprinting North’s 1993 Nobel Prize acceptance speech) [hereinafter North, Nobel
Prize Lecture].
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at least as an aspiration and the motor of competition, but
incorporates a more realistic view of the market’s functioning. As
Professor Williamson puts it, “Students of the NIE eschew
hypothetical ideals—which work off of omniscience, benevolence,
zero transaction costs, full credibility, and the like—and deal instead
with feasible organizational alternatives, all of which are flawed.”77
Just as transaction costs highlight the shortcomings of
neoclassical theory, they also explain the existence and functioning of
institutions, which are the protagonists of the NIE story. Coase
summarizes the need for a new institutional approach by pointing to
the essential role of institutions in exchange: “It makes little sense for
economists to discuss the process of exchange without specifying the
institutional setting within which the trading takes place, since this
affects the incentives to produce and the costs of transacting.”78 North
simplifies the equation: “When it is costly to transact, then institutions
79
matter. And it is costly to transact.” He goes on to define
“institutions”:
Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure
human interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (e.g.,
rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (e.g., norms of
behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct), and their
80
enforcement characteristics.

Institutions include not just law, but also social norms, mores, and
other private rules of conduct. Together these institutions direct the
functioning of an economy to a far greater degree than state
regulation alone. According to Coase,
[T]he costs of exchange depend on the institutions of a country: its
legal system, its political system, its social system, its educational
system, its culture, and so on. In effect it is the institutions that

77. Williamson, supra note 12, at 601.
78. Coase, supra note 72, at 718.
79. North, Nobel Prize Lecture, supra note 76, at 360; see also NORTH, supra note 11, at 12
(“The most important message, one with profound implications for restructuring economic
theory, is that when it is costly to transact, institutions matter. And as Wallis and North (1986)
have demonstrated in their measurement of the transaction costs going though the market (the
transaction sector) in the U.S. economy, it is costly to transact.”); Avery Katz, Taking Private
Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1758 (1996) (arguing that the “real lesson of the
Coase theorem” is “that private lawmaking is as important as public lawmaking, if not more
so”).
80. See North, Nobel Prize Lecture, supra note 76, at 360.
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govern the performance of an economy, and it is this that gives the
81
‘new institutional economics’ its importance for economists.

In addition to governing private conduct, institutions often help
overcome transaction costs. Institutions’ internal rules (which, as
North suggests, may themselves be “institutions”) aid in this function.
A strongly held norm of fair dealing, for example, reduces transaction
costs by lessening the need for formal contracting and enforcement
mechanisms. When levels of trust in a society are high, transactions
are cheaper because information and negotiation costs are lower—
transacting individuals do not have to spend as much time or money
investigating the background of their trading partners.82 Similarly, as
Robert Ellickson stressed in Order Without Law, social norms are
generally easier and cheaper to enforce than “formal” legal
sanctions.83
Despite the general support that their theory has attracted, NIE
theorists have not yet reached any solid conclusions about what
84
counts as an “institution” in the first place. Williamson, himself a
father of the NIE movement, opened a 2000 article with the
“confession . . . that we are still very ignorant about institutions” and
the “recommendation . . . that, awaiting a unified theory, we should
85
be accepting of pluralism.” Although its precise definition is
unresolved, “institution” is a term of art for NIE theorists. It excludes
many entities that are commonly referred to as “institutions.” In the
NIE framework, entities such as the Brookings Institution or the
Smithsonian Institution are not actually institutions, but rather
organizations—representatives of the broader institutional categories
of think tanks and museums. North defines organizations thus:

81. Coase, supra note 10, at 73.
82. Ekkehart Schlicht, On Custom, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 178, 180
(1993) (arguing that a strongly held norm of transparent land dealings “may render many
economic transactions possible without a need to rely on elaborate and costly safeguards. In
this, custom may contribute to economic efficiency.”).
83. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 282 (1991).
84. Nor, it should be noted, is the definition of “transaction costs” completely clear. Oliver
E. Williamson, Book Review, 77 CAL. L. REV. 223, 229 (1989) (reviewing R.H. COASE, THE
FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW (1988)) (“A chronic problem with Coase’s work has been
that the concept of transaction costs is vague. Being very elastic, transaction costs can be—and
sometimes are—used to rationalize any outcome whatsoever.”).
85. Williamson, supra note 12, at 595. Williamson does, however, offer a helpful framework
for separating four “levels” of institutions. See id. at 596–600.
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Organizations are made up of groups of individuals bound
together by some common purpose to achieve certain objectives.
Organizations include political bodies (e.g., political parties, the
Senate, a city council, regulatory bodies), economic bodies (e.g.,
firms, trade unions, family farms, cooperatives), social bodies (e.g.,
churches, clubs, athletic associations), and educational bodies (e.g.,
86
schools, universities, vocational training centers).

To simplify slightly: “If institutions are the rules of the game,
87
organizations and their entrepreneurs are the players.” There is thus
a difference between academia, which is an institution, and Duke
University, which is an organization. The relationship between the
two is close, of course, and is built on mutual dependence.
Organizations occupy and “reflect the opportunities provided by the
institutional matrix. . . . [I]f the institutional matrix rewards
productive activities then organizations—firms—will come into
existence to engage in productive activities.”88 Institutions set the
rules. Organizations follow and—crucially for the First Amendment
analysis here—apply them.
2. Separating Good Institutions from Bad. In addition to its
descriptive advantage over neoclassical analysis, the NIE also has a
normative component. To oversimplify slightly, the theory suggests—
and its devotees argue—that institutions are often better market
regulators than the government and that state-centered reforms
should often defer to private institutions and their norms.
NIE scholars themselves are somewhat divided about whether
institutions exist for the purpose of reducing transaction costs, or
whether they simply do so as a by-product of whatever other need
they fill. Professor Williamson has suggested that NIE still lacks a
good account of institutional formation, but that the evolution of
some institutions may be “spontaneous.”89 Professor North, too,
writes that “[i]nstitutions are not necessarily or even usually created
to be socially efficient; rather they, or at least the formal rules, are
created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to

86. North, Nobel Prize Lecture, supra note 76, at 361.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Williamson, supra note 12, at 597 (adding that “deliberative choice of a calculative kind
is minimally implicated”).
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90
create new rules.” North, however, has also argued that
“measurement and enforcement costs are the sources of social,
political, and economic institutions.”91 Professor Ellickson’s account
suggests that certain institutions may have evolved as a method of
92
lowering transaction costs.
Whether it exists by design or as a fortuitous side effect, the role
of institutions in promoting economic growth has earned the
93
endorsement of economic development theorists, especially those
94
who study property law. These theorists’ guiding principle is that to
enable economic development, structural change must focus on
effectively integrating embedded institutions with state-driven
95
reforms, and on designing institutions that lower transaction costs.
In Williamson’s framework, this means crafting legal institutions that
interact well with embedded institutions, rather than trying to simply
impose the former on the latter. Following these economic insights,
some legal scholars have suggested that reliance on social norms,
rather than formal legal rules, is both widespread96 and generally

90. North, Nobel Prize Lecture, supra note 76, at 360–61.
91. NORTH, supra note 11, at 27.
92. See ELLICKSON, supra note 83, at 167, 170–81; see also Robert Ellickson, The Market
for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 43 (2001) (“[P]resent[ing] a semirigorous model in
which a new norm arises out of the workings of a market for norms. . . . The model incorporates
numerous simplifying assumptions. . . . [Including] that members of a social audience selflessly
prefer utilitarian outcomes and that they can successfully coordinate the aggregate rewards that
they confer.”).
93. See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Unbundling Institutions, 113 J. POL.
ECON. 949, 988 (2005) (“[W]e found robust evidence that property rights institutions have a
major influence on long-run economic growth . . . while contracting institutions appear to affect
the form of financial intermediation but have a more limited impact on growth . . . .”); see also
Williamson, supra note 12, at 597 (describing property rights as part of the Level 2 “institutional
environment,” the “fomal rules of the game,” and contracts as part of Level 3, “the play of the
game”).
94. See, e.g., Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian & Francesco Trebbi, Institutions Rule: The
Primacy of Institutions Over Integration and Geography in Economic Development, 9 J. ECON.
GROWTH 131, 132–35 (2004) (discussing three main explanations for the difference in the
income levels of the world’s richest and poorest nations and “find[ing] that the quality of
institutions trumps everything else”).
95. See generally NORTH, supra note 11, at 3 (“That institutions affect the performance of
economies is hardly controversial. That the differential performance of economies over time is
fundamentally influenced by the way institutions evolve is also not controversial. . . . The
primary objective of [this] study is to achieve an understanding of the differential performance
of economies through time . . . .”).
96. Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal
Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 133 (1996) (“Most people do not take
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97
efficient. The best-known such work in legal circles is Ellickson’s
Order Without Law, which chronicles the resolution of disputes
between ranchers in Shasta County, California, detailing their
preference for social norms and sanctions rather than formal legal
rules and litigation.98 Other seminal works include Robert Cooter’s
analysis of customary land courts in Papua New Guinea99 and Clifford
100
Geertz’s study of bazaars in North Africa.
These scholars generally see legal reform as an exogenous
change, and they analyze the degree to which efficiency demands that
preexisting institutions be preserved or accommodated rather than be
101
replaced. In terms of property, for example, this may mean giving
special attention and respect to preexisting property norms such as
customary easements and dispute resolution rather than
implementing “top-down” legal change such as formal title
102
registration or new land courts. According to the theory, where
efficient customs and norms—institutions, that is—are in place, they

their disputes to lawyers and judges. Norms, rather than laws, provide the rules of
conduct . . . .”).
97. See generally AVINASH K. DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE
MODES OF GOVERNANCE 21–23, 152 (2004) (describing the literature of some institutions,
organizations, and surveys from the study of alternative institutions for the protection of
property rights and developing theoretical models of some of the same).
98. ELLICKSON, supra note 83, at 4. One of Professor Ellickson’s more recent contributions
applies a similar analysis to the “order without law” in the household. Robert C. Ellickson,
Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 297
(2006); Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 336, 340
(2007), http://thepocketpart.org/2007/04/16/ellickson.html. For a sample of Ellickson’s
intellectual ancestry, see JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 151 (1988).
99. Robert D. Cooter, Inventing Market Property: The Land Courts of Papua New Guinea,
25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 759 (1991).
100. Clifford Geertz, The Bazaar Economy: Information and Search in Peasant Marketing,
68 AM. ECON. REV. 28 (1978). For other examples of works that explore the relationship
between legal rules and social norms, see generally Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal
System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115
(1992); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001). For my own very modest
contribution to the discussion, see Joseph Blocher, Note, Building on Custom: Land Tenure
Policy and Economic Development in Ghana, 9 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 166 (2006).
101. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 99, at 794 (“Legislation that disrupts customs, whether in
the name of capitalism or socialism, may create inefficiency where there is none.”).
102. Id. (“Replacing customary land law with freehold substitutes markets for kin
organization. If imposed by legislative fiat, the freehold solution will disrupt the customary
economy by displacing its incentive system.”).
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103
should be entitled to deference as against strictly legal reforms. The
goal for development theorists who embrace NIE is generally to
conceptualize ways for these institutions, many of which are
“customary,” to become part of a “modern” legal system. These
theorists commonly argue that many economic reforms—
establishment of statutory property rights and a free market in which
to trade them, for example—are likely to fail if they are not attuned
to preexisting embedded institutions.104 In his 1992 Nobel Prize
acceptance speech, Professor Coase said presciently:

The value of including . . . institutional factors in the corpus of
mainstream economics is made clear by recent events in Eastern
Europe. These ex-communist countries are advised to move to a
market economy, and their leaders wish to do so, but without the
appropriate institutions no market economy of any significance is
105
possible.

This economic development rhetoric has an analogue in discussions
of free speech in emerging democracies, as scholars of the latter often
stress the need for speech-protective “institutions” such as the press
and a culture of dissent.106 When these institutions are absent, a
constitutional guarantee of free speech is unlikely to create a vibrant
marketplace of ideas.
But although institutions are generally the heroes in the NIE
107
story, not all of them live up to expectations, and some are market

103. See id. For an interesting and somewhat contrasting viewpoint, see Lisa Bernstein,
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1766–68 (1996). Professor Bernstein’s target is the premise,
expressed in the Uniform Commercial Code and by its main drafter, Karl Llewellyn, that courts
should try to determine “immanent business norms” and apply them in deciding cases. Id. For
Llewellyn’s view, see K.N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARV. L. REV.
873, 903–04 (1939).
104. O. Lee Reed, Law, the Rule of Law, and Property: A Foundation for the Private Market
and Business Study, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 441, 441–42 (2001); Blocher, supra note 100, at 171–80.
105. Coase, supra note 72, at 714. In his own Nobel Prize speech a few years later, Professor
North hit the same note: “Neoclassical theory is simply an inappropriate tool to analyze and
prescribe policies that will induce development. It is concerned with the operation of markets,
not with how markets develop.” North, Nobel Prize Lecture, supra note 76, at 359.
106. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Book Review, The Value of Dissent, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
859, 863 (2000) (reviewing STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF
AMERICA (1999)) (describing the effects of culture and political life on the meaning of free
speech in the United States).
107. Katz, supra note 79, at 1749 (“[P]rivate groups and communities are subject to the same
kinds of qualitative failures as are market and governmental institutions, and . . . there is little
theoretical reason to presume that private community norms will tend toward complete
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inhibiting rather than market improving. Even the most devoted
followers of the NIE do not support “deference” to corrupt
institutions or those, like slavery, set up to favor an oppressive
108
NIE theorists recognize that some institutions are
minority.
controlled by elites who have self-interested reasons for maintaining
an inefficient system.109 Other scholars stress that group norms may be
unable to keep pace with legal and technological change, and that
state action may be justified in the case of such entrenched, inefficient
customs.110
The institutions that are entitled to deference—the institutions
the state should try to accommodate rather than change—are those
that contribute to the free flow of goods and services.111 Separating
“good” from “bad” institutions is a difficult task demanding not just a
jeweler’s eye for detail (a role traditionally played by economists),
but a prospector’s ability to discover and describe institutions in the
first place.112 In keeping with the NIE’s holistic view of markets and
efficiency.”); North, Nobel Prize Lecture, supra note 76, at 363 (“There is no guarantee that the
beliefs and institutions that evolve through time will produce economic growth.”).
108. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1684 (1996)
(arguing that some customary norms such as racial discrimination are not entitled to legal
deference).
109. See EGGERTSSON, supra note 13, at 275–76 (1990) (“Property Rights, [sometimes]
serve the narrow self-interest of a special-interest group but cause substantial output losses to
the community as a whole . . . .”); NORTH, supra note 11, at 48 (“[T]here is nothing in my
argument so far about rules that implies efficiency. . . . [R]ules are, at least in good part, devised
in the interests of private well-being rather than social well-being.”); Douglass C. North, The
New Institutional Economics and Third World Development, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL
ECONOMICS AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT 17, 20 (John Harris et al. eds., 1995)
(“Institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient; rather they, or
at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to
create new rules.”).
110. Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1697–
98 (1996) (criticizing the widespread law and economics view that the social norms of close-knit
groups should be expected to be efficient, and arguing that the state may under some conditions
be better at producing efficient rules).
111. As Aaron Director put it with regard to the real world market, “Some institutions are
more flexible than others. We must choose those which minimize the risks of undesirable
consequences.” Director, supra note 22, at 10.
112. See ELLICKSON, supra note 83, at 254–55, 283–86 (suggesting when courts should and
should not defer to group norms). In addition to some modern scholarship such as Professor
Ellickson’s, which is commonly considered part of the law and economics movement, the law
and society movement demonstrated a commitment to “methods that come from outside the
discipline [of law] itself” and to “explain[ing] legal phenomena (though not necessarily all legal
phenomena) in terms of their social setting.” Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society
Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 763, 763 (1986); see also David M. Trubek, Back to the Future: The
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social institutions, this latter task—the gritty, detail-oriented job of
identifying institutions and explaining their inner workings—has
generally been performed by social scientists, including
113
114
political scientists,
and some economically
anthropologists,
115
inclined legal scholars. Williamson describes their work as “modest,
slow, molecular, [and] definitive.”116 Nevertheless, he justifiably has
“no hesitation” in “declaring that the NIE is an empirical success
117
story.” The following Part considers whether and how that success
might rehabilitate popular and academic understanding of the
marketplace of ideas.
II. INSTITUTIONS IN THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
A. The Institutional First Amendment
Although the marketplace metaphor remains the reigning (if
somewhat embattled) justification for free speech, it has yet to fully
incorporate an understanding of institutions.118 Nevertheless,

Short, Happy Life of the Law and Society Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 4, 6 (1990) (“[T]he
‘law and society idea’ mean[s] the reconceptualization of law in ways that make it amenable to
study by the social science. . . . [To do so] [w]e have to think of law as a social institution, as
interacting behaviors, as ritual and symbol, as a reflection of interest group politics, as a form of
behavior modification, or in some other way that makes it amenable to social scientific
analysis.”). An institutional law and economics approach would in many ways bridge the law
and economics and law and society disciplines. See Williamson, supra note 84, at 228–29
(arguing that Professor Coase’s work “establishes that transaction costs are central to applying a
law and economics approach to the study of legal rights and economic organization”).
113. See, e.g., MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF EXCHANGE IN
ARCHAIC SOCIETIES 1–2, 71 (Ian Cunnison trans., Norton 1967) (1925) (arguing that gift
exchange solidifies relationships and creates responsibilities between the giver and receiver).
114. See, e.g., ROBERT DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN
AMERICAN CITY 315–25 (1961) (analyzing governance in New Haven, Connecticut, and arguing
that a polyarchy of elite social and economic groups exert formal and informal control); G.
WILLIAM DOMHOFF, WHO REALLY RULES?: NEW HAVEN AND COMMUNITY POWER
REEXAMINED 174–75 (1978) (challenging Dahl’s central thesis and arguing inter alia that social
and business elites overlap, and that the New Haven Chamber of Commerce, Yale University,
and the largest local bank effectively ruled New Haven).
115. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 83, at vii (“I did not appreciate how unimportant law
can be when I embarked on this project.”).
116. Williamson, supra note 12, at 607.
117. Id.
118. Some scholars wrap a tunic around the marketplace metaphor and call it the “agora,”
invoking the public places in which Greeks (and later Romans) met to exchange goods and
ideas. See, e.g., David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment
Tradition, 95 YALE L.J. 857, 894 (1986). The word “agora” is, in fact, Greek for marketplace or
public square. A little bit of historical shading brings the agora metaphor in line with the
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Frederick Schauer has begun a quest to describe and define an
institutionally aware First Amendment. The fast-growing body of
work he has inspired may provide the basis for a First Amendment
theory that, like the NIE, accounts for the activity of institutions in
the marketplace.
In Professor Schauer’s conception, First Amendment doctrine
should be—and perhaps has been—attuned to speech institutions,
giving free speech protection to institutions according to how well
119
they vindicate the purposes of the First Amendment. Schauer
summarizes his theory thus:
. . . I want to suggest that a certain number of existing social
institutions in general, even if not in every particular, serve functions
that the First Amendment deems especially important, or may carry
risks that the First Amendment recognizes as especially dangerous.
To the extent that this is so, a recast First Amendment could more
consciously treat these institutions in rulelike fashion, with the
institutions serving as under- and overinclusive, but not spurious
markers of deeper background First Amendment values. . . . An
institutional First Amendment would thus move the inquiry away
from direct application of the underlying values of the First
Amendment to the conduct at issue and towards the mediating
determination of whether the conduct at issue was or was not the
120
conduct of one of these institutions.

The Institutional First Amendment thus requires courts and scholars
first to identify the “existing social institutions” that either advance or
threaten particular First Amendment values—certainly schools and
the press would qualify—and then pay special attention to the
boundaries and conduct of those institutions with the understanding
that institutional features and functions may indicate important First
Amendment values. Schauer recognizes that this institution-centered
jurisprudence initially appears to be at odds with a strong guarantee

institutional understanding of the marketplace, because (as any visitor to Athenian ruins can
testify) the agora itself was populated not just by individuals, but by temples, stoa, and guilds.
Scholars who embrace the agora metaphor should take note of its infrastructure.
119. Frederick Schauer, Is There a Right to Academic Freedom?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 907,
925 (2006) (“An institutional understanding of the First Amendment is structured around the
principle that certain institutions play special roles in serving the kinds of values that the First
Amendment is most plausibly understood to protect.”); Schauer, supra note 2, at 1273–77.
120. Schauer, supra note 2, at 1274.
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121
of free speech because it would require courts to consider the
identity of a speaker, and perhaps the content of its speech, in
determining what level of protection that speaker should receive.
Nevertheless, he argues persuasively that refusing to recognize
institutional tailoring can also have a “highly distorting effect”:122

When the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to delineate the
boundaries of the institutional press produces fewer press rights—in
particular, rights of access and rights to withhold confidentially
obtained information—than exist in many countries with a far more
constricted view of freedom of speech and freedom of the press in
general, there is some indication of a problem. When we are
compelled to treat mass distribution of detailed instructions for
causing harm in the same way that we treat an individual speaking to
a live audience, we face a different kind of problem: too much
123
protection rather than too little.

Whether Institutional First Amendment scholarship is
descriptive or simply normative is a matter of some debate. Schauer
himself has suggested that the theory may have some descriptive
accuracy,124 although not as much as it should. He offers Arkansas
Educational Television Commission v. Forbes125 and National
126
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley as examples of cases in which the
Supreme Court has explicitly relied on institution-specific ideas, thus
“mov[ing] it closer to a workable approach to managing the free
speech issues that arise within the government’s own enterprises.”127
Erwin Chemerinsky and Scott Moss, among others, have argued that
the Court is actually overly deferential to certain institutions such as
schools and prisons, and that these institutions may be speech stifling

121. Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 84, 85–86 (1998).
122. Schauer, supra note 2, at 1270–71.
123. Id. at 1270–71 (footnotes omitted).
124. Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration
of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1787 (2004) (“[T]he most logical
explanation of the actual boundaries of the First Amendment might come less from an
underlying theory of the First Amendment and more from the political, sociological, cultural,
historical, psychological, and economic milieu in which the First Amendment exists and out of
which it has developed.”).
125. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
126. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
127. Schauer, supra note 121, at 86.
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128
Schauer’s more recent work,
rather than speech promoting.
however, suggests that the Court has generally avoided the
institutional approach. He notes that the “American free speech
doctrine has never been comfortable distinguishing among
institutions,”129 and that “[w]hile occasional exceptions undoubtedly
can be found”130—Schauer counts broadcasts and speech in the
131
military among them —“it seems a permissible generalization to
conclude that First Amendment doctrine has been hesitant to draw
lines between or among speakers or between or among
132
communicative institutions.”
Whatever its accuracy as a descriptive matter, Institutional First
Amendment theory supports the normative notion that courts should
“defer” to speech—and, perhaps more importantly, speech
mediation—in certain institutional contexts. Courts should, for
example, be solicitous of reporters’ speech (and view with a
suspicious eye any attempts by the government to restrict that
speech), because the press is a recognizable “institution” whose
purpose and practice is in line with the purposes of the First
Amendment. On the other hand, forms of “institutional speech” like
corporate disclosure statements are not entitled to the same

128. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 441, 441 (1990) (“The protections provided by the United States
Constitution apply least where they are needed the most. Throughout American history . . . the
Supreme Court has adopted a posture of great deference to institutions of government such as
prisons, the military, schools, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Individuals in
these institutions have little, if any, protections of their most basic civil liberties.”); Ingber, supra
note 8, at 4 (1990) (“[W]hile first amendment doctrine has developed so as to expand expressive
liberty against the state acting as sovereign, Supreme Court opinions over the past decade
suggest that courts are to defer to . . . the judgments of governmental decision makers when
regulating expressive activity in institutional contexts such as public employment, school, and
the military.” (footnotes omitted)); Moss, supra note 18, at 1640 (“By dividing speech rights so
starkly by institutional context, courts have not just recognized, but in fact overstated, the
uniqueness of schools, workplaces, and prisons.”).
129. Schauer, supra note 121, at 84.
130. Schauer, supra note 2, at 1263.
131. Id. at 1263 n.43; see also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (finding no First
Amendment right to distribute political literature at a military base); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.
733, 743 (1974) (“While members of the military are not excluded from the protection granted
by the First Amendment, the different character of the military community and of the military
mission requires a different application of those protections.”); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (“Although broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by a First
Amendment interest . . . differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the
First Amendment standards applied to them.” (citation omitted)).
132. Schauer, supra note 2, at 1263.
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deference because they do not involve the kind of “institution” the
133
First Amendment was meant to protect.
The following Section proposes a more nuanced and helpful
conception of “institutions” for First Amendment analysis, one that
connects institutions to the best-recognized purpose of free speech
(the marketplace of ideas) and accords institutions First Amendment
protection based on how well they serve that purpose.
B. The New Institutional First Amendment
The marketplace of ideas has not caught up with the economic
understanding of institutions, and the Institutional First Amendment
has not incorporated the marketplace of ideas. As a result, the
common conception of the marketplace of ideas relies on an
134
and the Institutional First
unrealistic view of the market,
Amendment lacks an overarching theory of which institutions should
be given special treatment and why.135 This Section attempts to solve
both problems by proposing a “New Institutional First Amendment”
that adopts the marketplace of ideas as its animating metaphor but
incorporates the NIE understanding of institutions as transaction
cost–reducing market enhancers.
1. An Economic Approach to the Institutional First Amendment.
The New Institutional account of the First Amendment suggests that
for the same reasons that economists defer to institutions that
promote the economic market, judges should defer to institutions that
promote the marketplace of ideas. The New Institutional First
Amendment, like the New Institutional Economics, evaluates

133. See Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an Institutional
Approach to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613, 674 (2006) (“An institutional
approach seems to provide significant principled grounds for permitting greater speech
regulation, at least when applied in the realm of securities litigation.”).
134. Institutions have made a few cameo appearances in earlier discussions of the
marketplace of ideas. E.g., Ingber, supra note 7, at 27 (“Conflicts in the marketplace, therefore,
are not likely to lead to conclusive agreement on what is ‘true’ or ‘best.’ Rather the marketplace
serves as a forum where cultural groups with differing needs, interests, and experiences battle to
defend or establish their disparate senses of what is ‘true’ or ‘best.’”); see also id. at 85 n.416
(describing how the social perspectives that mold free speech are themselves products of the
“[e]cological setting, . . . [which] includes the concepts of history and cultural development”).
135. See Lee C. Bollinger, Public Institutions of Culture and the First Amendment: The New
Frontier, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1103, 1117 (1995) (“It is tempting to try to resolve which institutions
are entitled to autonomy by using history or ‘tradition’ as the dividing line . . . . But this is just as
inadequate for this purpose as it is in the public forum area.”).
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institutions by how well they advance the marketplace—the
underlying question that courts and scholars have asked of individual
speech acts ever since Abrams. By adding an institutional awareness,
the New Institutional First Amendment captures the descriptive and
normative power of Professor Schauer’s theory and also weds it to a
familiar animating principle.
New Institutional Economics scholars see institutions as social
constructs that, among other things, reduce transaction costs and
contribute to an efficient market. NIE theory thus demands not only
that economists look to the preferences of individuals in the market,
but also that they understand the institutions that shape the
underlying market. When those institutions are market enhancing—
and NIE theorists believe that they often are—legal reformers should
treat them with deference. In other words, strong institutions may be
better for the market than state-directed legal reform. The role of
speech institutions as market enhancers provides the necessary link
between the marketplace of ideas view of free speech and the
Institutional First Amendment view advanced by Schauer and
others.136 Just as institutions in the NIE framework improve the
market by facilitating the flow of goods and services, speech
institutions improve the marketplace of ideas by facilitating the flow
of ideas.
But of course this puts the institutional cart before the
transaction cost horse. The reason the NIE accords special treatment
to institutions, after all, is that they play an important role in
minimizing transaction costs. It may well be that there are
“institutions” in both the real-world economy and in the marketplace
137
of ideas, but are they really parallel concepts? Is it even possible to
conceptualize “transaction costs” in the marketplace of ideas? And
do speech institutions reduce transaction costs in the same way as
economic institutions? Fortunately for the New Institutional First
Amendment, the answer to all three of these questions is yes.

136. Although it is possible to “embrace the First Amendment because it promotes the
value of the marketplace of ideas as a facilitator of the search for truth,” Schauer, supra note 2,
at 1268–69, Professor Schauer explicitly does not do so, id. at 1269 n.71.
137. Cf. Mark D. Rosen, Institutional Context in Constitutional Law: A Critical Examination
of Term Limits, Judicial Campaign Codes, and Anti-Pornography Ordinances, 21 J.L. & POL.
223, 244–45 (2005) (identifying, without seeking to answer, the difficult question of “what
societal institutions properly play a role in determining whether free speech principles are to be
Tailored”).
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To begin with, the concept of institutions is similar enough to
enable useful comparison. In NIE theory, institutions are socially
created constructs that mediate interactions between market
participants by providing a background of social norms and
agreements to govern transactions even in the absence of formal law.
In the New Institutional First Amendment, institutions are
preexisting social constructs that mediate communication even in the
absence of formal speech regulation by the government. The two
conceptions are nearly identical. For the most part, in fact, speech
institutions are not just the equivalent of economic institutions, but a
subcategory within them. Most speech institutions are embedded
institutions like social norms governing public speech or educational
customs and traditions, many of which lower the cost of information
exchange. Journalistic norms protecting the confidentiality of sources,
for example, may improve the flow and quality of ideas in the
marketplace. Other speech institutions—like public schools and a
state-protected or state-supported press—are perhaps more
susceptible to state-centered change.
Just as the definition of institution is consistent between the NIE
and New Institutional First Amendment theories, so too does the
concept of transaction costs travel easily between them. The exchange
of ideas is what creates the competition that makes the marketplace
of ideas an attractive and effective explanatory metaphor for how
good ideas win out over weak ones. But the exchange of ideas, like
the exchange of goods and services, is not perfectly costless. Indeed,
many basic transaction costs—those associated with the search for
and understanding of information, for example—have even more
salience in the market for ideas than they do in the market for goods.
They are, in effect, transaction costs that relate only to information
exchange.
Returning to Professor Coase’s four categories of transaction
costs—search, negotiation, measurement, and enforcement138—some
parallels are immediately apparent. The search for good ideas, for
example, can be just as costly as the search for good products and
services. Both kinds of search require individuals to expend time and
energy seeking the best product or idea. Sometimes these search costs
are easily quantifiable. Money spent on consumer reports is a search
cost, as is the cost of books or school tuition that enable individuals to

138.

See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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find “truth” in the marketplace of ideas. Other search costs may be
both more sizeable and harder to measure. The difficulty of finding or
evaluating ideas, for example, is a type of search cost, one that is
pervasive and falls unequally on individuals depending on their
resources and cognitive abilities. Indeed, Professor Williamson
reports that “[t]here is close to unanimity within the NIE on the idea
of limited cognitive competence—often referred to as bounded
rationality.”139 Such limited ability—whether the result of limited
education, the influence of the government and elites on the market,
or some other factor—makes it difficult for individuals to be good
“buyers” of ideas.140 And as Justice Brennan recognized, “It would be
a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.”141
Search costs are not the only kinds of transaction costs that
appear both in the real-world market and in the marketplace of ideas.
Negotiation and measurement costs can be usefully conceptualized as
the time and energy spent debating and reaching a resolution about
which of competing ideas is better. Speakers with competing
conceptions of the good “negotiate” when they try to convince each
other of the merits of their positions, and they “measure” when they
compare the relative strength of those positions. Like search costs,
measuring the quality of an idea is an exercise requiring cognitive
resources—a very real cost, and one that not every market participant
is equally able to pay.
A simple example, one that invokes the marketplace of ideas
metaphor within a real-world market setting, may help illustrate how
the concept of transaction costs applies with equal force whether one
is talking about the exchange of goods or the exchange of ideas. A
shopper is considering two similar products. The products are
comparable, but differently priced, and the packaging of each
contains various claims about the product—“Delicious!” or
“Removes stains!” or “New fragrance!”—some of which are harder to
verify than others. Deciding between the two products, and deciding
which claims to believe, is an exercise that imposes both
informational and real-world costs.
The discerning shopper, hoping to choose the product that will
maximize her utility, might consult Consumer Reports for a review of

139. Williamson, supra note 12, at 600.
140. See Ingber, supra note 7, at 71–84.
141. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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the products, ask friends or store employees, or spend a few moments
comparing the products’ ingredients and claims. These activities
represent very real costs to the shopper. They are the sand in the
gears of the supposedly frictionless economic machine. If the cost of
this information exceeds the likely gain in utility from selecting the
right product, the shopper will simply act on imperfect information,
perhaps failing to choose the product that would make her most
happy. The time and money she wastes on the wrong product is both
a “real” cost and an opportunity cost. Only if she knew immediately
and costlessly which product she wanted (in fact, only if she did not
have to go to the store at all), would the costless, perfect market
transacting of the neoclassical model play out in real life. But if she
does not find the product she seeks, or cannot sort through the
product claims and choose the one that will maximize her utility, then
transaction costs will have prevented an otherwise efficient result.
Depending on how costs fall, the best product, like the “truth” in
Holmes’s marketplace, will not always rise to the top.
For all the same reasons that the shopper’s costly conundrum can
be conceptualized as a consequence of transaction costs in the “realworld” economic market, it also illustrates the transaction costs that
exist in the marketplace of ideas. The product’s packaging claims are
142
a form of speech —an “idea” that Holmes imagined competing with
others. The shopper pays real costs when she tries to “consume” that
idea, because to assess its “truth” she must first speak to a
knowledgeable friend or a store employee about the products’
relative merits, or weigh the reliability of the information she
receives. As her situation demonstrates, competition between ideas is
rarely if ever costless, and is therefore imperfect.
2. The Role of Institutions in the New Institutional First
Amendment. Because the concepts of “institution” and “transaction

142. For the purposes of the present analysis, I hold aside the question of whether under
contemporary doctrine the “speech” embodied in these product claims is entitled to
constitutional protection. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (suggesting that commercial speech is that which does
“no more than propose a commercial transaction” (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973))); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner,
Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 628 (1990) (arguing that commercial
speech should receive full First Amendment protection). The relevant point here is that
analyzing product claims, whether or not they are constitutionally protected, requires the
expenditure of mental and sometimes “real” resources.
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cost” both translate so well between NIE and the New Institutional
First Amendment theory, the final question must be whether speech
institutions, like their economic cousins, actually lower transaction
143
costs. It is this function, after all, that entitles institutions to
deference from economic or legal reformers. And with one important
qualification—that the answer is fundamentally an empirical one that
requires a rich understanding of how institutions function in the real
world—the answer to this final, crucial question also seems to be yes.
The institutional approach, in both real-world economics and First
Amendment “economics,” demands a thick understanding of realworld phenomena and institutions, an understanding that
marketplace of ideas theorists have not developed.144 The remainder
of this Section, however, offers some general observations about the
role of “speech institutions” in reducing the transaction costs of
communication. Part III then addresses in more detail the roles of
two specific speech institutions—schools and universities—in
lowering transaction costs and how First Amendment doctrine
accommodates those roles.
As explained in Part I.B, institutions in the NIE framework exist
at least in part to lower “transaction costs,” and economists have
filled bookshelves explaining how they do so. First Amendment
scholars have not yet responded with a comparable theory of the role
of speech institutions in mediating the “transaction costs” of
information exchange. Indeed, even discussions of the marketplace of
ideas generally do not characterize communication difficulties as
transaction costs.145 Nevertheless, it appears that some speech
institutions—like their NIE counterparts—do lower the transaction

143. One possible implication of this theory is that institutions grow in influence and utility
as transaction costs rise. The higher those costs become, the more important institutions can be
as mediators of transactions and contributors to overall efficiency. If true, this proposition
would suggest that certain developments that have reduced the transaction costs in the
marketplace for ideas—the Internet, Sullivan, supra note 8, at 1666 (“In cyberspace, barriers to
entry are low and no greater for speakers than listeners.”), and education generally—may
undermine the importance of other institutions (such as gossip and superstition) that owe their
influence to the fact that they reduce the costs of information exchange.
144. Frederick Schauer, Discourse and Its Discontents, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1309, 1333
(1997) (“A great deal of free speech theory and a great deal of discourse theory is marked by an
admirable epistemological optimism, but whether that epistemological optimism is well-founded
is in the final analysis an empirical question, as to which the resources of contemporary social
science research might help to locate an answer.”).
145. See supra notes 39–57 and accompanying text.
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costs of information exchange and are thus entitled to deference from
lawmakers.
Universities and the press are perhaps the easiest examples,
given their unique and well-recognized roles in the marketplace of
ideas. Universities lower information search costs by making ideas
and information widely available and more easily accessible. They
also lower search and measurement costs for students and faculty by
equipping them with better analytic tools with which to evaluate new
ideas. In the marketplace of ideas, a sharp and critical mind is the
equivalent of a good eye for quality goods and services in the realworld market. Both make it easier for consumers (whether of ideas or
products) to determine which of many options best suits them.
Similarly, the institutional press improves the marketplace of
ideas by serving as a clearinghouse for information. This, too, lowers
search costs and makes ideas more easily accessible for consumption
or rejection by individual idea consumers. The American press has
played a particularly important role in explaining and distributing
information about other institutions whose functioning would
otherwise be impossible for the average citizen to follow. Without
active and critical reporting about government, for example, it would
146
be impossible for citizens to cast informed votes, and the politicians
they elect could hardly claim to be triumphant in the marketplace of
ideas.
The deeper the analysis, the more obvious the parallels between
speech institutions and market institutions become. In both scenarios,
institutions made up of repeat players are more likely to have
147
communication-enhancing norms. Just like market actors, repeat
speech players are less likely to violate norms, lie, or break promises,
because they know that repeat interactions are inevitable. Institutions
such as universities regularize these relationships, allowing individuals

146. Whether voters actually do cast informed votes is a matter of some debate. Bryan
Caplan has argued that rational consumers often make for irrational voters. See BRYAN
CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE BAD POLICIES
3 (2007) (“Voter irrationality is precisely what economic theory implies once we adopt
introspectively plausible assumptions about human motivation. . . . [D]emocracy has a built-in
externality. . . . Since most of the cost of voter irrationality is external . . . why not indulge?”).
147. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law, 23
J.L. & ECON. 1, 3 (1980). The canonical study is by Clifford Geertz. Geertz, supra note 100, at
30–31 (arguing that traders in a North African bazaar lessen search and negotiation costs
through a process of “clientelization,” which occurs through repeated face-to-face interactions
between buyer and seller).
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within those institutions to “transact” ideas more cheaply. To take
just one example, a professor may be a more efficient communicator
of information precisely because that professor (or the institution of
which the professor is a part) has a reputation for imparting accurate
information. Those who hear a well-known professor give a lecture
on cell biology, or President Nixon’s economy, or the First
Amendment, feel less of a duty to “double-check” the information
they are receiving than they would if a random person on a street
corner were shouting the very same lecture. The trust the listeners
place in the information they receive saves them from having to pay
what could otherwise be substantial information costs.
Moreover, it is important to recognize that transaction costs are
paid not just by those trying to find good ideas, but by those trying to
spread them. And although the cost of receiving information may be
high, the cost of transmitting it is often even higher. By forming and
joining groups, individuals can defray the costs of communication and
148
more effectively direct their ideas into the marketplace. In this way,
institutions mitigate the cost of selling ideas as well as the cost of
purchasing them.
Speech institutions like universities and schools can improve the
marketplace of ideas by lowering the transaction costs of information
exchange. Doing so may at times require them to regulate their own
members’ speech, as when newspapers require reporters to back up
articles with quotes and research, or when schools require teachers to
cover certain subject matters. These internal restrictions, although
occasionally limiting the speech of individual actors (such as
journalists and teachers), preserve the ability of the institutions
themselves to enhance the marketplace of ideas and their members’
149
ability to participate in it. Just as economic institutions’ self-

148. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (“Effective
advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably
enhanced by group association . . . .”). Interestingly, one can see a political predecessor of this
economic theory in the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville, who noted that “nothing . . . deserves
more attention” than Americans’ propensity to join “intellectual and moral associations.”
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 488 (J.P. Mayer & Max Jerner eds.,
George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966) (1835). These “free institutions,” in de
Tocqueville’s view, help to “combat the effects of individualism.” Id. at 481.
149. Hafen, supra note 8, at 686 (“Indeed, as the Court is beginning to note, personal rights
may take ongoing sustenance from certain forms of institutional nurturing.”); see also Corp. of
the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342–44 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(“Solicitude for a church’s ability to [engage in self-definition] reflects the idea that furtherance
of the autonomy of religious organizations often furthers individual religious freedom as well.”).
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regulating norms sometimes promote overall efficiency in the
marketplace for goods and services, speech institutions’ internal
regulation often improves the ability of the marketplace of ideas to
find truth. Alvin Goldman and James Cox point out that “[d]omains
of opinion where speech is totally unregulated, or is at most regulated
by the market, are arguably the domains where maximum error and
150
falsity are to be found.” These are the domains “in which rumor,
gossip, old-wives’ tales, and superstition flourish.”151 On the other
hand, there are “certain forums for scientific and scholarly speech
that are highly regulated, and which, nonetheless, are responsible for
what many people take to be the greatest amount of knowledge.”152
Other institutions, however, may not be so conducive to the
153
transmission of ideas. Like the economic institutions studied by NIE
scholars, not all speech institutions receive special treatment, nor
should they. And even those speech institutions that are accorded
special status under the First Amendment can effectively forfeit that
status when they—or, as explained in Section B.3,154 the organizations
that populate them—apply their rules capriciously or in a way that
155
undermines the market. After all, it is the market-enhancing quality
of institutions that entitles them to deference in the first place. The
difficult question is how to separate the good institutions—those that
advance the market (whether it be in goods or ideas)—from the bad.
That question is impossible to answer without a conception of free
expression and why it is valuable. The New Institutional First
Amendment provides that missing piece by wedding the Institutional
First Amendment to the metaphor that has guided First Amendment
jurisprudence for nearly a century: the marketplace of ideas. To the
degree that speech institutions serve that market—the same question
courts have been asking of individual speech regulations since 1919—
they should be entitled to deference from lawmakers, just as the

150. Goldman & Cox, supra note 42, at 12.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 13.
153. Dale Carpenter, Response, The Value of Institutions and the Values of Free Speech, 89
MINN. L. REV. 1407, 1407 (2005) (“Some institutions are better First Amendment citizens than
others. If we want a robust First Amendment, why should we be blind to that?”).
154. See infra text accompanying notes 160–64.
155. Cf. Cooter, supra note 108, at 1684 (“The state cannot justify enforcing a norm that
harms one community on the grounds that it arose from a consensual process in another
community.”).
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institutions in the NIE framework are entitled to deference from
economists.
3. The Crucial Difference between Speech Institutions and
Speech Organizations. The discussion thus far has focused mainly on
speech institutions that advance the marketplace of ideas. There are
also many institutions that do not. Perhaps the most significant
criticism of the Institutional First Amendment is that it is “blind to
whether the preferred institution is actually serving important free
156
speech interests in a given case.” What happens when otherwise
“good” institutions apply their internal rules in a way that does not
advance the marketplace of ideas? Does an educational institution—
which would otherwise be entitled to great deference from courts—
still get deference when it limits speech for reasons unrelated to the
marketplace of ideas?
Fortunately, the New Institutional First Amendment, drawing
again from NIE theory, offers an answer to that question. The key lies
in the distinction between institutions—which Professor North
identifies as the rules of the game, including norms and customs157—
and organizations, which he identifies as the players in that game.158
The problem usually arises when certain organizations fail to live up
to their speech-promoting institutional norms.
Despite the usual labeling of them as such, individual
universities, schools, and newspapers are not “institutions” in the NIE
(and thus New Institutional First Amendment) sense. Whereas the
university system is akin to an institution, individual colleges and
159
universities are more akin to organizations. To be sure, they have an
especially close relationship with the larger institutional structure and
are “governed” by its norms. This, after all, is what entitles
organizations (like institutions) to some level of deference in their
speech-related decisions. But unlike institutions—which are generally
too diffuse to be subject to the whims of dominant individuals—
organizations are subject to capture and may end up limiting speech

156.
157.
158.
159.

Carpenter, supra note 153, at 1414.
See supra notes 80, 87–88 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
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in ways that advance the interests of the individuals who control
160
them, but do not improve the marketplace of ideas.
More often that not, overly strict limits on speech are a result of
organizations misapplying institutional norms. In such a situation, no
deference is due. Take the example of a university that refuses to
allow Christian speakers on campus. Such decisions, when made for
“academic” reasons, generally receive broad deference from courts, a
deference that can be justified by the unique role of universities as
161
Holding aside any
marketplace-of-ideas-enhancing institutions.
Free Exercise or Establishment Clause issues,162 the university might
try to justify the exclusion of Christian speakers by claiming that
religious discourse does not contribute to the search for “truth.” The
argument could even be couched in the marketplace-enhancing
function that justifies universities’ special First Amendment
treatment. But without more, it should—and likely would—fail under
the New Institutional First Amendment, because such a broad
exclusion of speakers seems on its face to limit the marketplace rather
than advance it. Even giving some deference to the university’s
alleged interpretation of its institutional norms, a court would likely
see the appeal to the marketplace of ideas as pretextual at best. The
same reasoning would probably apply if a university’s administration
bowed to the wishes of rich donors who demanded, for political
reasons, the firing of a certain controversial professor. Other
nonacademic reasons might lead a university to ban speakers who
applaud (or criticize) Israeli military policy. Such a decision, whatever
its merits, would effectively limit the marketplace of ideas, which is
the very concept that entitles universities to special First Amendment
treatment in the first place.163 When this happens—when groups flout

160. There is perhaps a tenuous analogy here to corporate corruption, in that institutions (or
organizations) can sometimes stray from the purposes for which they were established—and
which their members/shareholders support—and instead pursue the interests of a few dominant
elites. See generally Sullivan, supra note 8, at 1663 (“Put another way, speech intermediaries that
exceed the function of norm-reflection and stray into norm-creation, on this view, cross over a
public/private boundary and begin to resemble governments.”).
161. See infra Part III.B.
162. E.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845–46
(1995) (holding on free speech grounds that a public university could not refuse to fund certain
student publications that expressed belief in a deity, and that the university’s need to comply
with the Establishment Clause did not cure the violation).
163. The same argument about principled distinctions applies with full force to the
designation of institutions in the first place. See Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First
Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 294 (1981) (“The point I wish to
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the rules that justify their special treatment—there is little reason for
164
courts to defer to the misapplication of their own norms.
Determining whether an organization is misapplying its institutional
norms would, of course, require courts to investigate the content and
application of those norms. But that would be no more difficult a task
than their responsibility to investigate, for example, whether a
particular limitation on speech amounts to viewpoint discrimination.
The same questions arise in NIE scholarship, and the same
solution applies. Customary law, for example, is an institution that is
commonly accorded deference in property relations, and NIE
theorists frequently argue that customary arrangements should not be
disturbed by formal law. But when customary authorities—tribal
165
leaders, for example —stop living up to the market-enhancing norms
they have established, or when those norms are applied to
disadvantage a particular social group (often women) instead of
advancing the market as a whole, no deference is due.
This distinction between organizations and institutions
complicates the “deference” for which this Article has argued.
Deference to institutional norms is easy enough to explain and
defend, but how should courts treat organizations’ interpretations of
institutional norms? For example, if a university bars speakers who
are critical (or laudatory) of the Israeli military, and the university
claims that it has done so on academic grounds, how should a court
respond? Such “academic” decisions are generally entitled to the
special, institutional First Amendment treatment accorded to
universities. But what if the would-be speakers claim that their
exclusion was based not on a market-enhancing academic decision,
but on nonacademic factors such as administrators’ personal
preferences, or viewpoint discrimination?

make is that the creation of a category must be justified by reasons underlying the features
distinguishing that category from others. When those reasons are not applied in all cases in
which they are, by their own terms, applicable, then the attempt to create a category has
misfired.”); see also id. at 307 (“The risk of misapplication of numerous subcategories leads us to
eschew subcategories within the first amendment, avoiding them even when a distinction seems
justifiable.”).
164. Posner, supra note 96, at 160 (“In the case of groups that engage in undesirable
behavior, however, courts should not use legal sanctions to promote solidarity. Courts should
instead interfere so as to inhibit the group’s undesirable norms.”).
165. Blocher, supra note 100, at 192–201 (arguing that customary property arrangements
should be respected but also shaped so as to preserve the property interests of disempowered
groups such as women and migrants).
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Such situations present a difficult question that might be likened
to a dispute over the “standard of review” applicable to
organizations’ interpretations of institutional norms. The example
here involves institutional norms that are generally entitled to
deference (academic decisions, which usually advance the
marketplace of ideas) and the interpretation of those norms by an
intermediary organization (the school’s apparent determination that
academic principles bar the presence of certain speakers). Are the
latter organizations’ interpretations of these norms entitled to
deference as against courts’ interpretations, just as institutional norms
themselves are entitled to deference as against statutory law? The
answer can only be yes. As with agency interpretations of their own
166
regulations,
organizations’ interpretations of their animating
institutional norms should be entitled to deference.167 The precise
level of deference may vary among institutions or organizations, but
in any case the burden will fall on the party challenging the norm to
show that the organization has misapplied it.
4. Apparent Weaknesses and Unexpected Strengths.
The
distinction between organizations and institutions is not the only linedrawing complication raised by the New Institutional First
Amendment. Separating organizations from institutions is a difficult
task, to be sure, but it may be simpler than separating those that are
“public” from those that are “private.”168 Only those institutions that

166. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844–45, 865–
66 (1984) (describing the circumstances under which courts should defer to agencies’ reasonable
interpretations of their own regulations).
167. Although he does not address the difference between organizations and institutions,
Professor Schauer suggests that organizations are entitled to deference even when they
misapply the institutional norms that justify their special treatment. See Schauer, supra note 2,
at 1273 n.87 (“I am [concerned] with the identification of concrete and preexisting cultural
institutions that might in the large serve important free speech functions, and which thus might
be deserving of constitutionally guaranteed autonomy as institutions, even when they do not
serve the purposes grounding the recognition of their institutional autonomy in the first
instance.”).
168. Courts have struggled with this public/private distinction. Compare Robins v.
Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980) (upholding the state’s power to grant high
school students the right to seek signatures for a political petition on the grounds of a private
shopping center, despite the owner’s assertion of his First Amendment right to disassociate from
their speech or cause), and Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 313 (1968) (holding that union picketing of a private shopping center was
entitled to First Amendment protection), with Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520–21 (1976)
(denying First Amendment protection to employees seeking to picket inside a privately owned
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have some element of state action are relevant for constitutional
purposes, given that only they are subject to the First Amendment.
But speech institutions do not respect the distinction between public
and private that marks the outer edge of the First Amendment’s
169
coverage.
Somewhat ironically, then, the New Institutional First
Amendment’s focus on institutions, most of which are private,
highlights the fact that most speech regulation is beyond the law’s
reach. By doing so, the theory actually makes a far more important
contribution, by highlighting the fact that institutions, rather than the
state, are the primary regulators of speech. The most powerful—
though perhaps not the most obvious—speech “regulations” are
social norms and mores, backed by the threat of social ostracism or
170
sanction. Most speakers fear not prosecution nor exclusion from
public forums, but approbation and ostracism from friends, family
members, employers, and fellow citizens. It seems likely, for example,
that more racist speech is deterred by social norms (many of them
171
internalized) than by any formal legal rules. By drawing attention to
these speech-governing institutional norms, the New Institutional

mall), and Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972) (refusing to grant First Amendment
protection to private parties distributing political leaflets at a private shopping center).
169. This point applies mostly to what Professor Williamson refers to as Level One
“embedded” institutions. See Williamson, supra note 12, at 596–97 (defining Level One
Institutions as those in which “norms, customs, mores, traditions, etc. are located”). Level Two
and Three Institutions, however, such as the government bureaucracy and court-centered
dispute resolution, are products of state law and thus fall within state action doctrine. The
public/private distinction—extended along the spectrum of institutions—is particularly difficult
to apply in the context of colleges and universities, which I consider in more detail in Part III.
Indeed, “private and public institutions of higher learning share so many characteristics that
distinguishing between them threatens to be rigidly formalistic.” Julian N. Eule & Jonathan D.
Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to the Private Sector: With Every Wish There
Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1537, 1574 (1998) (footnote omitted).
170. Ingber stresses the degree to which the government controls this “socialization,” for
example, through the “indoctrination” that occurs in public schools. Ingber, supra note 7, at 28–
29. Although not discounting the degree to which the state can influence the socialization,
especially through schools, I believe that the majority of social norms and mores are beyond the
reach of the state.
171. See Jon Elster, Social Norms and Economic Theory, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Autumn
1989, at 99, 104 (arguing that internalized norms are often followed even when their violation
would go undetected by society); Katz, supra note 79, at 1750 (“[A]n important feature of social
norms is their tendency to be internalized by group members.”) (footnote omitted). Of course,
not all speakers are dissuaded by social sanction, and some provocateurs may actively seek it
out.
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First Amendment paints a broader and more accurate picture of what
“free speech” actually means.
Holmes’s theory suggests that government regulation is the only
impediment to a free marketplace of ideas. But the New Institutional
First Amendment demonstrates that, as in economic markets, the
172
alternative to regulation by government is regulation by institutions.
The lawyerly obsession with the state action requirement obscures
the fact that only a very small part of the marketplace of ideas is
173
public. Contrary to the implications of Holmes’s theory, the absence
of state regulation does not automatically create a perfect free market
for ideas any more than it creates a perfect, frictionless economic
market. First Amendment theories that are limited to the small public
corner of the market involving state action may give a full account of
the Constitution’s domain, but they do not even come close to
describing the marketplace of ideas. That marketplace is largely
private, and it is privately regulated. It exists in homes, malls, bars,
workplaces, and schools, governed by private norms and rules. And
although these areas of the market are largely beyond the reach of
the Constitution, they are not beyond—in fact they are part and
parcel of—free speech institutions. A theory that recognizes this, as
the New Institutional First Amendment does, paints a richer picture
of the marketplace of ideas.
One might argue, however, that if institutions are entitled to
deference with regard to the content of their norms, then they should
also be responsible for enforcing those norms. On this reading, a
university could set its own speech code, but could not call on the
power of the state to expel those who violate it. But as Eric Posner
points out, “[A]lthough solidary groups obtain and process most
kinds of information more effectively than courts, their nonlegal
sanctions are sometimes less powerful than the courts’ legal
sanctions.”174 Thus private institutions may be unable to enforce their
own norms, even when those norms are more efficient than state-

172. See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1641, 1678 (1967) (“With the development of private restraints on free expression, the
idea of a free marketplace where ideas can compete on their merits has become just as
unrealistic in the twentieth century as the economic theory of perfect competition. The world in
which an essentially rationalist philosophy of the first amendment was born has vanished and
what was rationalism is now romance.”).
173. For a discussion of the pitfalls of state action doctrine, especially as it applies to the
First Amendment, see Eule & Varat, supra note 169, at 1543–54.
174. Posner, supra note 96, at 157.
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created alternatives. In such situations, court intervention may be
necessary to maintain the efficient norms. Any awkwardness in using
courts to identify and apply what are nominally the institution’s own
norms is no more troubling than using courts to enforce private
175
contracts, or to determine and apply “immanent business norms.”
Deference to the content of an institution’s norms is justified by the
efficient development of those norms. But in some circumstances the
enforcement of these norms can be performed more easily by the
state, just as with state-backed enforcement of other private
agreements.
One might object that this demands too much of courts, which
are better suited to deal with formal legal doctrine than with messy
176
institutional realities. As Professor Schauer puts it, “For too many
judges, it seems, delineating the contours of such [speech] institutions
177
would look like a rather unjudicial enterprise.” But even Schauer’s
critics allow that “the possible line-drawing difficulties do not seem
that much more difficult than other line-drawing problems in the First
Amendment.”178 Indeed, contemporary doctrine requires judges to
draw difficult (and perhaps impossible) lines between government
speech, commercial speech, and other judicially created categories.179
The final Part of this Article considers in more detail the New
Institutional First Amendment’s ability to describe the doctrine
surrounding two particularly important First Amendment
institutions—schools and universities—and suggests how it might
contribute to a more coherent commercial speech doctrine. But for
now it suffices to say that one of the strengths of the theory is that it is
not only coherent and normative, but that it demands no more of
courts than they already do. In many cases, deferring to community
norms may not even require courts to identify those norms at all. For
example, First Amendment doctrine already requires courts to defer
175. See Bernstein, supra note 103, at 1820 (identifying “a number of undesirable effects on
commercial relationships between merchants created by the [Uniform Commercial] Code’s
search for immanent business norms”).
176. See Schauer, supra note 2, at 1259 (“Much of this reluctance stems from a view about
the functions and comparative advantage of the courts. If courts are thought to have little ability
to fathom the changeable and empirical foundations of our institutional lives, then there is an
extraordinarily strong temptation to draw doctrinal lines on the basis of ‘principle’ rather than
‘policy.’”).
177. Id. at 1266.
178. Carpenter, supra note 153, at 1408.
179. I have argued elsewhere that such line drawing is impossible. Joseph Blocher, School
Naming Rights and the First Amendment’s Perfect Storm, 96 GEO. L.J. 1, 57 (2007).
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in a wide variety of ways to community norms, which are themselves a
kind of institution. Obscenity cases are perhaps the most obvious
example, as the Supreme Court has held that “obscenity is to be
180
determined by applying ‘contemporary community standards.’”
But even if courts are able to accurately identify and properly
defer to a particular institution’s norms, giving or denying deference
to those norms might have unexpected effects on the institution or on
181
the balance of power between institutions. Denying an institution
the power to regulate its members’ speech, for example, could
undermine the institution’s cohesiveness, and even limit its ability to
contribute to the marketplace of ideas.182 Perhaps more intriguing,
however, the level of First Amendment deference institutions receive
is likely to influence the institutions’ success in the marketplace of
ideas. The recent controversy over commercial speech in Kasky v.
183
Nike provides an illustrative example. Kasky began when a number
of private citizens and journalists began criticizing Nike for allegedly
abusing workers in overseas sweatshops. Nike responded by
publishing a series of “editorial advertisements,” press releases, and
letters sent to newspapers and universities.184 Mark Kasky, a private
citizen, alleged that Nike’s information campaign contained false and
misleading statements made “with knowledge or reckless disregard of
the laws of California prohibiting false and misleading statements.”185
He also argued that Nike’s public relations campaign, even though it
was a response to his own fully protected speech, was actually
“commercial” speech not entitled to full First Amendment
protection.186 The California Supreme Court agreed.187 The United

180. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37 (1973).
181. See Posner, supra note 96, at 134–35.
182. Id. at 136 (arguing that certain kinds of regulation can have “perverse results,”
including undermining self-regulation).
183. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247 (Cal. 2002), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1099 (2003),
cert. dismissed, 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
184. Thomas C. Goldstein, Nike v. Kasky and the Definition of “Commercial Speech,” 2002–
2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 63, 65, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/scr/2003/commercial
speech.pdf.
185. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 248.
186. Id. at 247. There was precedent for his assertion. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5 (1980) (finding a difference between “direct
comments on public issues” and statements about public policy “made only in the context of
commercial transactions”); see also infra Part III.C.
187. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 247. See generally Tamara R. Piety, Free Advertising: The Case for
Public Relations as Commercial Speech, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 367, 369 (2006) (discussing

01__BLOCHER.DOC

868

4/16/2008 8:29:05 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:821

188
States Supreme Court granted —and later controversially
189
dismissed —certiorari, sparking two written dissents190 and a
collective sigh of disappointment from First Amendment scholars.191
Although it was not explicitly premised on any institutional
favoritism, Kasky illustrated the stakes. If commercial institutions are
not entitled to full First Amendment protection, they are at a
competitive disadvantage in the marketplace of ideas when pitted
against institutions—such as political groups or universities—that do
receive such protection.
Nor is the New Institutional First Amendment a perfect answer
to all “economic” objections to the marketplace of ideas metaphor.
The addition of institutions does not change the fact that the
marketplace metaphor is particularly attractive for those with power
in the real-world market, because they are more likely to have the
“economic, social, political, psychological, and cultural resources” to
dominate in both spheres.192 Moreover, Robert Cooter has suggested
that economic norms are entitled to deference only when they arise
from an efficient incentive structure—open competition with few
“externalities” imposed on nonmembers of the institution.193 But as
Professor Schauer points out, many areas of constitutionally
protected speech effectively require those harmed by such speech to
bear the costs (whether mental or “real,” as for therapy or to avoid
hateful speakers) of benefits that accrue to the speaker.194 These

Nike v. Kasky and arguing that “the commercial speech doctrine would be better served by
applying it to all marketing-related speech, including public relations”).
188. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 537 U.S. 1099, 1099 (2003).
189. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 655 (2003).
190. Id. at 665 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
191. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Landmark Free-Speech Case
That Wasn’t: The Nike v. Kasky Story, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 1018 (2004) (“But alas,
Justice Stevens and his two colleagues could do no more than offer conflicted hints on how they
might rule in a Nike-like case.”); Samuel A. Terilli, Nike v. Kasky and the Running-but-GoingNowhere Commercial Speech Debate, 10 COMM. L. & POL’Y 383, 385 (2005) (noting “the
absence of any meaningful consensus regarding what is or is not commercial speech or how it
ought to be treated”).
192. Frederick Schauer, The Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principle, 64 U. COLO. L.
REV. 935, 951 (1993). Professor Carpenter takes the point even further, suggesting that the very
recognition of institutions that receive First Amendment treatment will be colored by the
preferences of the elites with the power to make that determination. Carpenter, supra note 153,
at 1411 (“[T]he institutions favored by courts and even academics will tend to be traditional
ones.”).
193. Cooter, supra note 108, at 1695.
194. Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1321–24 (1992).
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particular kinds of market failure—externalities and closed access to
markets—are not necessarily corrected by an institutionally aware
First Amendment any more than they are by contemporary First
Amendment doctrine.
Finally, one might point to the apparent irony that under the
New Institutional First Amendment, institutions such as universities
that are committed to improving the marketplace of ideas may
195
actually have less power to limit speech than other institutions do.
Their “special” First Amendment status can be more of a burden
196
than a boon. In State v. Schmid, the New Jersey Supreme Court
reversed the convictions of two Labor Party members who had been
arrested for distributing political material on the Princeton University
campus without prior authorization from the university.197
Commenting on the case, Sanford Levinson noted that Princeton
essentially lost “only because it is otherwise such an admirable
institution in terms of its own commitment to the values of liberal
democracy.”198 Such results might theoretically disincentivize the
endorsement of speech-protecting institutions. But what such cases
really highlight is not that speech institutions have less power than
other institutions to regulate speech, but rather that they must justify
their restrictions on speech according to how they advance the
marketplace of ideas. As explained in Part III.B, universities (and, to
an even greater degree, K-12 schools) actually retain broad discretion
to limit speech on campus. But in keeping with academia’s
marketplace-of-ideas-enhancing mission, these restrictions must be
justified as academic judgments that will ultimately improve the
market.
In summary, courts should (and generally do) defer to marketenhancing institutional rules when those rules are fairly applied by
199
the institutions or organizations that developed them.

195. Of course, the same might be said of public forum doctrine, because it strictly limits
government power over speech in forums which the state has opened for speech. See Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267–68 (1981).
196. State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980).
197. Id. at 616, 633.
198. Sanford Levinson, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Access to Private Property
Under State Constitutional Law, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 51, 59
(1985).
199. For a “strictly pragmatic” version of this approach, see Katz, supra note 79, at 1752
(“[I]f public policymakers have good reason to think that a given private norm is efficient, based
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Differentiating between good and bad speech institutions and
organizations is a tall order, one that demands an underlying theory
200
of free expression that allows for such sorting. This is what the New
Institutional First Amendment offers, by tying institutional free
speech analysis to the marketplace of ideas metaphor that has guided
free speech jurisprudence for so long. Deference to institutional
norms does not commit lawyers or courts to the status quo, nor does
it prevent them from pressing for change; it simply presents them with
a different set of tools with which to do so.201 The final Part of this
Article suggests how those tools might be usefully applied to certain
oft-recognized speech institutions.
III. APPLYING THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Morse Code: The Supreme Court’s Nuanced Endorsement of the
New Institutional First Amendment in Schoolhouse Speech Cases
In June 2007, the Supreme Court handed down Morse v.
202
203
Frederick, the fourth major school speech case it has ever decided.
The splintered Court ruled that a high school principal did not violate
the First Amendment by confiscating a banner reading “BONG HiTS

on their own independent analysis, they should defer to it, and if they have good reason to think
it inefficient, they should not defer.”).
200. See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 1657–66 (considering different possibilities for
differentiating between speech institutions).
201. The most important way is by pushing for change in institutional norms, not just formal
laws. Katz, supra note 79, at 1757 (“[W]e could argue within the private communities to which
we belong in favor of more efficient and effective norms—writing op-ed pieces, attending
neighborhood meetings, serving on volunteer committees, and the like—the very work that in
previous generations helped make lawyers the leaders of their communities.”).
202. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
203. The first three were Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393
U.S. 503 (1969), Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), and Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). I do not include cases such as West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), which involved speech on school
grounds but did not rest squarely on a theory of school speech. I note, however, that even those
cases tangentially reaching the school speech question have tended to support the institutional
view. See Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad., 127 S. Ct. 2489, 2495–96
(2007) (holding that a high school sports association could prohibit high school coaches from
recruiting middle school athletes in part because the association needed to do so to manage the
league); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982) (holding that the First Amendment limits
schools’ power to remove books from library shelves); Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 820 (9th
Cir. 2007) (holding that, despite student election candidates’ free speech right to campaign
spending, a state university may impose a dollar limit on spending because “educational
interests outweigh the free speech interests of the students”).
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4 JESUS” and disciplining a student who refused to take it down
204
himself. Although its holding seems limited, Morse’s reasoning
confirms the descriptive and predictive validity of the New
Institutional First Amendment.
Deference to speech institutions’ internal norms is dependent on
the degree to which those institutions advance the marketplace of
ideas. This inquiry cannot be answered solely by reference to law. It is
in many ways—to invoke another of Holmes’s famous dicta—a
205
question of “experience” rather than “logic.” Experience has
proven that schools enhance the marketplace of ideas and that they
must occasionally limit student speech to do so. The education that
schools impart doubtless improves students’ ability to participate in,
and contribute to, the marketplace of ideas. But to educate, schools
must often impose rules on students, especially younger ones, who are
still on their way to becoming fully functional buyers and sellers of
ideas. Indeed, the importance of schools’ internal regulation has been
recognized for at least as long as the marketplace of ideas metaphor
has been employed. John Stuart Mill, whose marketplace-like
conception of free speech was a close cousin of Milton’s and an
ancestor of Holmes’s, explicitly excluded children from the market:
“It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to
apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are
not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age which the
law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood.”206 Writing more
recently, Bruce Hafen explicitly connected the marketplace metaphor
to schools’ need to control students to prepare them to participate in
that market:
In a public school, the marketplace of ideas cannot be controlled by
judges as a practical matter, nor can it be controlled by students as a
matter of personal maturity; therefore, if faculty and administrators
lack the discretion to control it, there is little meaningful
marketplace at all—neither in the school nor in the public square of
207
the future.

204. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.
205. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (“The life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experience.”).
206. MILL, supra note 24, at 135–36.
207. Hafen, supra note 6, at 706. Of course, support for schools’ authority to limit speech is
not universal. See Hafen, supra note 8, at 689 (“Many have concluded that a high school really is
a public forum in which the adult ‘marketplace of ideas’ concept holds full sway.”).
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Deference to schools’ regulation of student speech is thus well in line
with popular and academic understandings of the purpose of schools.
In keeping with this shared understanding—and vindicating the
New Institutional First Amendment—the Supreme Court has long
208
treated K-12 schools as special speech institutions. The Court’s
schoolhouse speech cases—beginning with Tinker v. Des Moines
209
Independent Community School District and continuing through
Morse—demonstrate the Court’s attempt to balance students’ First
Amendment rights (which undoubtedly follow them into school every
day) with schools’ need to prepare those students to participate in the
marketplace of ideas. These cases are tied together by the notion,
210
voiced by Justice Stewart in Ginsberg v. New York, that “a child . . .
is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the
presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.”211
In Tinker, the Court famously held that “[n]either students [n]or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”212 Professor Schauer reads this
passage as “reaffirm[ing] the general presumption that First
Amendment rights do not vary substantially with institutional
setting.”213 But Tinker is entirely consistent with the New Institutional
First Amendment. The Court’s decision could be read as giving
schools power only to limit personal intercommunication that is
unrelated to “the work of the schools,”214 or as holding that even
personal intercommunication is protected unless it “materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others.”215 Either reading, however, vindicates the notion that
the schools’ power over student speech is coextensive with the
schools’ institutional mission—education and the spread of ideas—

208. See Hafen, supra note 6, at 718 (“In this sense, a school is unlike any other arm of the
federal or state governments, because non-educational institutions have fundamentally different
purposes and functions.”).
209. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
210. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
211. Id. at 649–50 (Stewart, J., concurring).
212. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
213. Schauer, supra note 2, at 1263.
214. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
215. Id. at 513.
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which is what justifies schools’ unique First Amendment treatment in
216
the first place.
Moreover, the Court’s later school speech cases—all of which
have upheld restrictions on student speech—have demonstrated an
increasing institutional awareness. In Bethel School District No. 403 v.
217
a student was suspended after delivering a sexually
Fraser,
suggestive speech at a high school assembly.218 Upholding the
suspension and the school’s authority to determine “what manner of
219
speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate,” the
Court clarified that even though the First Amendment did apply to
students in public schools, their free speech rights “are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings.”220 Specifically, Fraser held that a school need not tolerate
student speech that “would undermine the school’s basic educational
221
mission.” The decision was thus attuned to the institutional needs of
schools, upholding their authority to impose restrictions on student
speech that interferes with the school’s ability to perform its
institutional function—to educate, and thus to advance the
marketplace of ideas.
222
Two years later, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
elaborated and clarified Tinker and Fraser. In Hazelwood, a high
school principal removed two controversial articles from the school
newspaper on the grounds that the students who wrote them had not
mastered certain requirements of the journalism curriculum, and that
the articles would threaten both the privacy of other students and the
223
legal, moral, and ethical obligations of the writers. The Court found
that “we cannot reject as unreasonable Principal Reynolds’s
conclusion that neither the pregnancy article nor the divorce article
216. See id. at 507 (“[T]he Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the
comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.”).
217. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
218. Id. at 677–78.
219. Id. at 683.
220. Id. at 682.
221. Id. at 685; see also Hafen, supra note 8, at 693 (“The Court’s analysis suggests that the
Hazelwood standard involves two stages of inquiry: courts must first ask whether the student
expression at issue occurs in a context that implicates the school’s educational mission and must
then ask whether the educator’s decision has a rational—but not necessarily an explicitly
educational—basis.”).
222. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
223. Id. at 276.
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was suitable for publication.” and that “no violation of First
224
Amendment rights occurred.” In other words, the Court applied a
kind of reasonableness review—highlighting the “standard of review”
225
question —to a school’s (organization’s) interpretation of its own
curricular (institutional) norms. The First Amendment protects
student speech “only when the decision to censor . . . student
226
expression has no valid educational purpose.” Sounding like an NIE
theorist arguing for government deference to preexisting economic
institutions, Justice White observed that “the education of the
Nation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and
state and local school officials, and not of federal judges.”227
Tinker established that the First Amendment applies in schools,
but Fraser and Hazelwood clarified that high school principals could
limit student speech when that speech would interfere with the
228
schools’ educational (institutional) goals. Read together, these three
cases support the New Institutional First Amendment conclusion,
explicitly confirmed by the Court in Hazelwood, that “schools as well
as courts can advance and protect the values of the first
amendment.”229
Morse continues this general trend, upholding the power of
schools to limit student speech while justifying those restrictions
(albeit not explicitly) in the name of schools’ special role in the
marketplace of ideas. In Morse, the Court upheld the power of
schools to limit speech that reasonably appears to encourage illegal
drug use, but protected students’ free speech right to advocate
decriminalization or any other “idea” that might contribute to the
230
marketplace. Justice Alito’s controlling concurrence, joined by

224. Id.
225. See supra Part II.B.3
226. Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
227. Id.
228. The distinction between acceptable and unacceptable speech restrictions may track the
line between topics on which the schools themselves can have a legitimate “speech” interest.
Thus restrictions on speech about drugs and sex pass muster, but not restrictions on speech
about the Vietnam War. I leave aside this point—which I thank Scott Moss for bringing to my
attention—only because I believe it raises thorny issues about the difference between contentand viewpoint-based restrictions and the role of institutions as speakers. See generally Randall
P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 IOWA L. REV. 735 (1995) (arguing that only useful
institutional speech should receive First Amendment protection). I hope to address these
important complications in future work.
229. Hafen, supra note 8, at 685.
230. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2636 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring).
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Justice Kennedy, clarifies the limited holding of the case, while
effectively justifying it by reference to the marketplace of ideas:
I join the opinion of the Court on the understanding that (a) it
goes no further than to hold that a public school may restrict speech
that a reasonable observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug
use and (b) it provides no support for any restriction of speech that
can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social
issue, including speech on issues such as “the wisdom of the war on
231
drugs or of legalizing marijuana for medicinal use.”

Chief Justice Roberts’s putative majority opinion strikes a similar
tone, citing passages from Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and other cases
232
to stress the “special characteristics of the school environment.”
Indeed, all four of the opinions in Morse that reached the First
233
Amendment question highlighted the institutional role of schools,
albeit drawing different conclusions about what that role allowed or
required.234 Justice Alito announced that “public schools are
235
invaluable and beneficent institutions,” and that speech restrictions
within them must be (and can be) “based on some special
characteristic of the school setting.”236 He found that the school’s
responsibility to keep students safe from drugs was just such a
237
characteristic. Although the majority opinion gave more rhetorical
support to the school’s position, it too was based on a concern for
student safety and refused to endorse a rule that would allow schools
to restrict student speech based solely on its offensiveness: “After all,
much political and religious speech might be perceived as offensive to

231. Id.
232. Id. at 2621 (majority opinion) (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,
266 (1988) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969))).
233. Justice Breyer, concurring in part and dissenting in part, did not fully reach the First
Amendment question, and would have resolved the case on qualified immunity grounds. Morse,
127 S. Ct. at 2638 (Breyer, J., concurring).
234. Interestingly for the marketplace metaphor, there seemed to be some debate within the
Court—and even within Justice Roberts’s own opinion—as to whether Frederick’s sign was
intended to convey any idea at all. Compare id. at 2624 (majority opinion) (“Frederick himself
claimed ‘that the words were just nonsense meant to attract television cameras.’”), and id. at
2625 (“[N]ot even Frederick argues that the banner conveys any sort of political or religious
message.”), with id. (“At least two interpretations of the words on the banner demonstrate that
the sign advocated the use of illegal drugs.”).
235. Id. at 2637 (Alito, J., concurring).
236. Id. at 2638.
237. Id.
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238
some.” Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, expressed his
belief that Tinker and its progeny should be overruled, and that the
First Amendment simply does not apply to student speech in
239
schools.
Arguing for an even stronger level of institutional
deference than advocated in this Article, Justice Thomas wrote that
“[l]ocal school boards, not the courts, should determine what
pedagogical interests are ‘legitimate’ and what rules ‘reasonably
relat[e]’ to those interests.”240 At the other end of the spectrum,
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, objected that
“[t]o the extent the Court defers to the principal’s ostensibly
reasonable judgment, it abdicates its constitutional responsibility.”241
Although Justice Stevens allowed that student speech is proscribable
if it “violates a permissible rule []or expressly advocates conduct that
is illegal and harmful to students,”242 he expressly declined to defer to
the principal’s interpretation of those rules:243 “The beliefs of third
parties, reasonable or otherwise, have never dictated which messages
244
amount to proscribable advocacy.” But Justice Stevens’s dissent
only highlighted what the majority, drawing on Tinker, Fraser, and
Hazelwood, had decided: That schools are entitled to deference in
choosing and applying rules designed to protect their institutional
missions. The opinions of the Court—Chief Justice Roberts’s
majority and Justice Alito’s controlling concurrence—thus support
the New Institutional First Amendment described here.

238. Id. at 2629 (majority opinion).
239. Id. at 2634 (Thomas, J., concurring).
240. Id. at 2636 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)); see
also id. at 2631 (“In short, in the earliest public schools, teachers taught, and students listened.
Teachers commanded, and students obeyed. Teachers did not rely solely on the power of ideas
to persuade; they relied on discipline to maintain order.”). Thomas is not alone in this view. See
Stanley Fish, Think Again—Clarence Thomas Is Right, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2007, http://fish.
blogs.nytimes.com/2007/07/08/clarence-thomas-is-right (claiming that the First Amendment
should not apply to students or teachers because education occurs in a different context than
democracy).
241. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2647 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 2644.
243. Id. at 2647. Interestingly, the school district’s written rule governing student speech
was, in Justice Stevens’s assessment, “otherwise quite tolerant of non-disruptive student
speech.” Id. at 2646. The rule reads in part: “Students will not be disturbed in the exercise of
their constitutionally guaranteed rights to assemble peaceably and to express ideas and
opinions, privately or publicly, provided that their activities do not infringe on the rights of
others and do not interfere with the operation of the educational program.” Id. (quoting the
school’s written rule).
244. Id. at 2647.

01__BLOCHER.DOC

2008]

4/16/2008 8:29:05 AM

NEW INSTITUTIONAL FIRST AMENDMENT

877

In 1987, Bruce Hafen noted that “the Supreme Court has begun
quietly—almost as a series of asides—to consider the place of an
educational institution, qua institution, within first amendment
245
theory.” Morse furthers that project, demonstrating the Court’s
attention to schools as unique speech institutions with their own
marketplace-enhancing internal norms. The New Institutional First
Amendment both describes and justifies this treatment of
schoolhouse speech while relieving some of the apparent tension
between students’ right to speak and educators’ need to occasionally
restrict that speech in order to teach them.246 Best of all, the New
Institutional First Amendment does this by reference to one of the
First Amendment’s first principles—the advancement of the
247
marketplace of ideas.
B. Universities as Speech Institutions
The institutional needs and norms that justify the Court’s
deference to K-12 schools’ internal regulation of student speech do
not apply with equal force to universities, even though universities
are undoubtedly “speech institutions.” Although schools and
universities both advance the marketplace of ideas, they do so in
different ways and demand (and deserve) different levels of
institutional deference. And just as the New Institutional First
Amendment would predict, courts hold universities to a different
standard in light of their unique institutional norms. Thus high

245. Hafen, supra note 6, at 712 (citation omitted).
246. See id. at 665 (“The degree of authority required to teach children and to preserve an
educational environment is fundamentally at odds with the anti-authoritarianism of the first
amendment tradition, because education by definition involves the imposition of restraints.”).
247. See Hafen, supra note 8, at 698 (“The root question, which the typical first amendment
model fails to address, is how to organize and operate schools in order to maximize their overall
contribution to the values and purposes of the first amendment.”).
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248
249
schools may impose restrictions on student and teacher speech
that would not pass constitutional muster on a college campus.250
Professor Schauer writes that “an institutional account of the
First Amendment would not surprisingly recognize a special place for
the country’s colleges and universities, whose historical and current
mission is to play a central role in challenging conventional
251
wisdom.” Explicitly tying universities to the marketplace of ideas
metaphor, Justice Brennan wrote in Keyishian v. Board of Regents:252
“The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’ The Nation’s
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that
robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of
253
tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.’”
But who exactly is it that “challenges conventional wisdom,” to
paraphrase Schauer? The university’s administration, which makes its
rules? The student body? The faculty? Claiming a special role for
“universities” as institutions is one thing—most First Amendment
scholars, not to mention judges and the general public, would
probably agree with that much. But the exact contours of that special
treatment can be difficult and contentious when one disaggregates the
institution. What happens if a university passes an internal rule saying
that students cannot criticize the administration? Who gets special
First Amendment treatment in that situation—the university
administration, as the representative of the “speech institution”? Or

248. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988) (allowing the
removal of student-written articles from a high school newspaper, when the articles may have
violated other students’ privacy and may have been inappropriate subject matter for younger
students); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (upholding a student’s
suspension for delivering a lewd and suggestive speech at a school assembly).
249. Schauer, supra note 119, at 912 (“Existing lower court doctrine indicates that
substantially more restrictions are permissible for primary and secondary school teachers than
for those who are teaching at the college and university level.”).
250. Eule & Varat, supra note 169, at 1593 n.241 (“In a college setting, of course, the
protection afforded pupil speech more closely approximates full-citizen speech rights than that
conferred on students in the secondary schools.”).
251. Schauer, supra note 119, at 925; see also id. at 907 (“Most American constitutionalists—
who are also academics, to be sure—would agree that there is a constitutional right to academic
freedom and would agree that the right exists in, around, or at least near, the First
Amendment.”). See generally Paul Horwitz, Grutter’s First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461
(2005) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s affirmative action cases can be read as institutionally
aware First Amendment decisions).
252. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
253. Id. at 603 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1943), aff’d, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)).
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would that be a situation in which “the tie goes to the speaker, not the
254
censor”? As the analysis throughout this Article has demonstrated,
deferring to institutions based on their contribution to the
marketplace of ideas means considering not just the speech they
produce, but the speech they suppress.255
This much, at least, seems clear: Unlike K-12 schools,
universities’ First Amendment function—their contribution to the
efficiency of the marketplace of ideas—does not require or justify
extensive internal speech regulations. To effectively educate young
students, K-12 schools must commonly restrict speech. This tension,
and society’s acceptance of it, is justified by the fact that young
students are not fully equipped to be active participants in the
marketplace of ideas. The very purpose of schools is to prepare them
for that role. Universities, by contrast, have a student body made up
of young adults who are trusted—and in American culture,
expected—to challenge ideas and question authority. They are better
equipped than they were as K-12 students to participate in the
marketplace of ideas. As a result, restrictions on their speech are less
likely to be marketplace enhancing.
This does not mean, however, that universities have no power to
limit speech through the imposition of institutional norms. Although
they cannot resort as easily as K-12 schools to the discipline-andorder justification, universities are just as—if not more—entitled to
claim that their decisions to restrict or enable speech are made in the
interest of advancing the pursuit of knowledge and truth. And when
those claims are genuine, they should be—and generally have been—
respected. This is true even when the universities’ institutional
interests conflict with those of individual students or professors, as
256
they inevitably do. But even when those individuals claim that their
speech acts are academic, and thus contribute to the marketplace of
ideas, universities’ decisions to limit their speech can be academic

254. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2669 (2007) (“Where the First
Amendment is implicated, the tie goes to the speaker, not the censor.”).
255. Cf. Matthew W. Finkin, On “Institutional” Academic Freedom, 61 TEX. L. REV. 817,
825 (1983) (“[I]nstitutional autonomy was perceived as an integral element of the theory of
academic freedom and played an important role in making German institutions among the
intellectually freest in the world.”).
256. Schauer, supra note 119, at 919 (“[T]here is no avoiding the conflict between a view of
academic freedom that views individual academics as its primary and direct beneficiaries, and a
contrasting view that locates the right in academic institutions, even if doing so limits the
individual rights of the employees of those institutions.”).

01__BLOCHER.DOC

880

4/16/2008 8:29:05 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:821

257
judgments as well. To the degree that a university’s decision can be
justified as marketplace enhancing, courts are likely to defer to it. In
Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing,258 for example, the
Court upheld the University of Michigan’s dismissal of a student for
academic reasons, citing the “academic freedom” of “state and local
educational institution.”259 Justice Stevens explained that “[a]cademic
freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited
exchange of ideas among teachers and students but also, and
somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decisionmaking by the
260
academy itself.” The Court refused to override “the faculty’s
professional judgment” unless it was “such a substantial departure
from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or
committee responsible did not actually exercise professional
judgment.”261
Universities are thus entitled to institutional deference when it
comes to speech regulations that improve, not limit, the free flow of
information and ideas. For example, controversial speakers are often
allowed to speak only at certain times and places—on the quad, for
example, or in an auditorium, but not in the classroom of their
choosing. In addition to being reasonable time, place, and manner
262
restrictions, such regulations can be justified on the simple ground
that the would-be speaker’s contribution to the marketplace of ideas
would not outweigh the overall cost to the marketplace caused by
disrupting classes or the library.263 Put another way, a rule that

257. See id. at 920.
258. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
259. Id. at 226; see also Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 88–90
(1978) (deferring to university’s academic judgment in due process cases).
260. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 n.12 (citations omitted).
261. Id. at 225.
262. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“Our cases make clear,
however, that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the
time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information.’” (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 293 (1984))).
263. The university might also argue, of course, that its decision to cancel the speech is itself
an act of speech, because the controversial lecture would inevitably carry the university’s
imprimatur. The Supreme Court, after all, has recognized that there is no constitutionally
significant difference between the right to speak and the right to remain silent. See, e.g., W. Va.
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
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prohibits controversial speakers from delivering speeches in the
library or in classrooms actually enhances the marketplace of ideas,
because it protects students’ ability to learn.
When universities impose internal restrictions on speech that are
not marketplace enhancing, however, their institutional commitment
to free speech may actually limit their power under the First
Amendment. In State v. Schmid, the Princeton case discussed in Part
II.B.4,264 the court seemed to base its decision on the fact that
“Princeton . . . clearly seeks to encourage both a wide and continuous
exchange of opinions and ideas and to foster a policy of openness and
freedom with respect to the use of its facilities.”265 The Schmid court
thus determined that the university’s attempt to impose speech
restrictions could not be justified as an academic decision intended to
perfect the marketplace of ideas.
A more difficult question would have arisen if the issue were
framed as a purely academic dispute. Consider the hypothetical
situation of a young literature professor who believes, contrary to
accepted wisdom, that Lord Byron was not part of the British
Romantic movement and refuses to teach his work in a romance
literature class, much to the consternation of the department
chairman. Backed by the university’s administration, the chairman
argues that the romance literature class is the only one in which
Byron can be taught, and that literature students must learn Byron to
succeed as scholars. The young professor refuses to budge and is
eventually disciplined by the university. Invoking the First
Amendment, the professor claims that the punishment violates the
right to free speech. The university responds that its own decision is
purely academic, based on its desire to prepare students for
participation in the marketplace of ideas.266 The case is assigned to a

orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein.”). But see Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Inst.
Rights, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1311–13 (2006) (rejecting universities’ First Amendment freedom of
association claims).
264. See supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text.
265. State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 631 (N.J. 1980).
266. In keeping with the New Institutional First Amendment, the university’s academic
motivation would be of primary importance, and would differentiate this hypothetical from a
case in which a university tried to avoid bad press by preventing a controversial professor from
“speaking” on its behalf. See Ryan J. Foley, Letter Warned Barrett to Stop Seeking Publicity,
CAMPUS WATCH, Aug. 3, 2006, http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/2671 (reporting the
university provost’s declaration that “[w]e cannot allow political pressure from critics of
unpopular ideas to inhibit the free exchange of ideas” but that the provost had also told a

01__BLOCHER.DOC

882

4/16/2008 8:29:05 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:821

judge who has read a fascinating and convincing law review article
about the New Institutional First Amendment, which the judge
intends to apply faithfully. Should the judge defer to the university’s
decision to sanction the professor, or does the professor’s individual
academic freedom win out? Both sides, after all, have invoked norms
that would seem to improve the marketplace of ideas.267
According to New Institutional First Amendment theory, the
university should probably prevail. To fulfill their role in advancing
and improving the marketplace of ideas, universities must have power
to control how students are taught. Their institutional norms are
entitled to—and generally receive—deference from courts, at least
when those norms serve the role that justifies universities’ special
treatment in the first place. Decisions about curriculum are precisely
the kind of institutional regulations that universities are entrusted to
make in the name of the marketplace of ideas. Faced with the choice
between one honest academic decision (the university’s) and another
(the professor’s), courts should—and likely will—defer to the
organization’s interpretation of the institutional rule.
In Julian Eule and Jonathan Varat’s words, “[T]he university is a
community in which robust traditions of open discourse and tolerance
for competing ideas predate efforts to summon constitutional
canons.”268 Such paeans to the speech-enhancing role of universities
tend to cast universities as special speakers, and they undoubtedly do
play that role. But the flip side of institutional autonomy is deference
to the role of universities as regulators of speech. Universities are
rightly treated as particularly important managers of, and actors in,
the marketplace of ideas. But when universities act contrary to these
“robust traditions” by limiting speech in ways not likely to improve
the marketplace of ideas, courts are unlikely to defer, nor should
they.

controversial professor that he must be careful not to suggest “that you speak for the
university”).
267. Eule & Varat, supra note 169, at 1557 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s holding in
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), for failing to explore “the possibility that First
Amendment rights lay on both sides of the private dispute”); Sullivan, supra note 8, at 1654
(“[W]hen government attempts to restrict the power of private intermediaries to restrict speech,
there usually are free speech interests on both sides.”).
268. Eule & Varat, supra note 169, at 1574–75 (citation omitted).
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C. Commercial Speech: The Marketplace Metaphor in the RealWorld Market
Given this Article’s focus on marketplaces and institutional
economics, there can be no better place to conclude than with a
consideration of commercial speech, the arena where the marketplace
of ideas most clearly overlaps with the real-world market. In his
dissenting opinion in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. New
York Public Services Commission,269 the case that established the
contemporary test for restrictions on commercial speech, Justice
Rehnquist suggested that there was no principled distinction between
the marketplace of goods and the marketplace of ideas.270 This Section
concludes that the New Institutional First Amendment may support
Justice Rehnquist’s view and may also cast light on both the
relationship between the real-world marketplace and the marketplace
of ideas on the one hand, and on the past, present, and future of
commercial speech doctrine on the other.
Prior to 1976’s Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
271
commercial speech received no
Citizens Consumer Council,
constitutional protection and could be regulated more or less at the
government’s discretion. For current purposes, the most interesting
critic of this approach was none other than Ronald Coase. In two
articles written in the 1970s, Coase highlighted the unequal
intellectual positions occupied by the market for ideas and the market
for goods.272 Turning to the intersection of the two, Coase argued that
“[a]dvertising, the dissemination of messages about the goods and
services which people consume, is clearly part of the market for ideas.
Intellectuals have not, in general, welcomed this other occupant of
their domain.”273 He concluded one of his articles with a discussion of
274
then-current cases, including a district court case from Virginia

269. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
270. Id. at 592–94 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
271. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
272. See Coase, supra note 5, at 1–2; Coase, The Market for Goods, supra note 64, at 384; see
also supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text; cf. Director, supra note 22, at 3 (“The free
market as a desirable method of organizing the intellectual life of the community was urged
long before it was advocated as a desirable method of organizing its economic life.”).
273. Coase, supra note 5, at 8–9.
274. Id. at 29–31.
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called Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. v. State Board of
275
Pharmacy, and a prediction:
It would seem probable that these decisions do not define the outer
bounds of the applicability of the First Amendment to advertising
but merely mark a stage in a gradual expansion of the kinds of
commercial speech which will be brought within the protection of
276
the First Amendment by the courts.

In this, as in so many other things, Coase was right. The very
district court case he cited made its way to the Supreme Court, where
Justice Blackmun took the opportunity to rule, for the first time
clearly, that commercial speech was entitled to First Amendment
protection: “What is at issue is whether a State may completely
suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about
entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information’s effect upon its
disseminators and its recipients. Reserving other questions, we
conclude that the answer to this one is in the negative.”277
Harkening back to Justice Holmes’s marketplace metaphor,
Justice Blackmun wrote that “society also may have a strong interest
278
in the free flow of commercial information.” He then held that
“speech which does ‘no more than propose a commercial
transaction’” is not “so removed from any ‘exposition of ideas,’ and
from ‘truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of
liberal sentiments on the administration of Government’” that it
should be completely without protection.279
But what Justice Blackmun did not create, and what commercial
speech doctrine still lacks, is a comprehensive definition of what
counts as “commercial speech.” Rather than drawing clear
boundaries, the Supreme Court has relied on “various descriptions,
indicia, and disclaimers without settling upon a precise and

275. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. v. State Bd. of Pharmacy 373 F. Supp. 683 (E.D.
Va. 1974), aff’d, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
276. Coase, supra note 5, at 31–32.
277. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976)
(footnote omitted). In an addendum to his article, Professor Coase acknowledged that Virginia
State Board had confirmed his view, and offered another prediction, one which has not yet
proven itself: “Now that it has been decided that commercial speech is covered by the First
Amendment, consideration of the limits of its application, the inevitable ‘balancing,’ can
proceed in a sensible manner, a process in which the studies by economists of the effects of
advertising may be expected to play a useful role.” Coase, supra note 5, at 33–34.
278. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764.
279. Id. at 762 (citations omitted).

01__BLOCHER.DOC

2008]

4/16/2008 8:29:05 AM

NEW INSTITUTIONAL FIRST AMENDMENT

885

280
In part, the Court’s hesitance to
comprehensive definition.”
establish a single firm definition reflects the fact that advertising and
other forms of commercial speech have become increasingly difficult
to recognize in practice. Indeed, viewers of many modern
advertisements may have a difficult time discerning what product or
service is being offered, or how it relates to the ad they have seen.
Thus, unlike the school and university examples discussed in Sections
A and B—both of which admit of reasonably straightforward
definition—discussions of commercial speech are plagued by the
difficulty of identifying commercial activity in the first place.
The New Institutional First Amendment does not offer a simple
solution, but it does have a clear diagnosis: the primary problem with
commercial speech doctrine is the lack of an institutional identity.
Commercial speech is difficult to define precisely because, to a far
greater degree than universities, “commercial speakers” do not
comprise a readily identifiable institution. Is “business” an
institution? What of noncommercial speakers—such as universities or
the government—who occasionally engage in commercial acts?
Answering those questions only leads to a second-order but equally
important question: is “business” the kind of speech institution that is
entitled to First Amendment protection—that is, does it advance the
free flow of ideas in the marketplace of ideas? These are difficult
questions for which the New Institutional First Amendment—like
contemporary commercial speech doctrine—does not provide easy
answers.
Nevertheless, elements of the New Institutional First
Amendment could easily be incorporated into current commercial
speech doctrine, and may help lead to a better definition of the
category itself. Despite lacking a firm definition of “commercial
speech,” in Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service
Commission, the Court established a four-prong test that grants
commercial speech (whatever it is) a sort of intermediate level of
281
protection. Some parts of Central Hudson’s test already reflect the
Holmesian marketplace model, and could easily accommodate a
greater institutional focus. The first prong, for example, which asks

280. Piety, supra note 187, at 381; Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of
Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REV. 55, 56 (1999).
281. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
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282
whether the speech involved is false or misleading, fits well with the
New Institutional First Amendment approach. Speech that is false or
misleading can hardly be said to contribute to the marketplace of
ideas, and institutional or organizational speakers that deliver such
speech do not contribute to the marketplace. The Court has
“concluded that all ideas, but only accurate statements of fact, further
self-government,”283 and Central Hudson itself said that the
government had the power to “ban forms of communication more
likely to deceive the public than to inform it.”284 The second and third
prongs assess “whether the asserted governmental interest is
285
substantial” and “whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted.”286 These inquiries would remain the
same under an institutional approach. Similarly, the fourth prong of
the Central Hudson test—that measuring overbreadth287—could
relatively easily be transformed into an inquiry about the boundaries
of the institution whose speech acts are at issue. Under this reading,
an overbroad restriction on speech would be one that impermissibly
cut across institutional boundaries, limiting the speech of “good”
institutions as well as “bad.”
Whether these modifications of the Central Hudson test would
appreciably advance the search for a coherent commercial speech
doctrine is a question demanding more analysis than can be afforded
288
here. Some complications are immediately evident. For one thing,

282. Id. at 566. See also Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 496 (1982)
(holding that the government may entirely ban commercial speech that proposes illegal
transactions); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13–15 (1979) (upholding a statute prohibiting the
practice of optometry under misleading names); see also Jeffrey Lefstin, Note, Does the First
Amendment Bar Cancellation of REDSKINS?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 665, 674–75 (2000) (discussing
Friedman in the context of whether the Washington Redskins’ trademark constitutes
commercial speech).
283. Ingber, supra note 7, at 14 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 340–41
(1974); Ocala-Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 301 (1971) (White, J., concurring);
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 405 n.2 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
284. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
285. Id. at 566.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. The Court has signaled that it may be considering a move to an entirely new framework
of analysis. As discussed in Part II.B.4, the Court in 2003 granted certiorari in a widely watched
case, Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 655 (2003), which offered an opportunity to revisit and clarify
both the definition of commercial speech and its governing standard. See Goldstein, supra note
184, at 70–72. But to the disappointment of First Amendment scholars, id. at 63-64, the Court—
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First Amendment questions arise on somewhat different footing in
the commercial context than in academic contexts. The major
question in school and university cases is generally whether the
academic institution (or organization) can internally regulate
individual speech, whereas in the commercial speech cases the
question is usually whether the government (or even another
institution) can regulate the speech of the commercial institution or
organization.
Suffice to say, the Supreme Court’s commercial speech doctrine
has evolved in fits and starts. But despite ups and downs, the trend
has been to accord increasing protection to “commercial” speech,
both by applying the governing Central Hudson test more strictly and
by classifying less and less speech as commercial in the first place. It is
possible to fit both of these two trends—a contracting category of
commercial speech and an expanding protection for the speech within
it—into the New Institutional First Amendment framework. To
reconceptualize in terms of that framework, one might say that the
Court has come to accept Professor Coase’s view that commercial
289
speech “is clearly part of the market for ideas,” and perhaps that the
institutions and organizations who deliver it are entitled to special
First Amendment treatment.
CONCLUSION
For all the power it has exercised over free speech theory since
Abrams, the marketplace of ideas metaphor has done little to keep
pace with changes in economic theory. Although criticisms of the
marketplace of ideas metaphor have mirrored—and in many
instances explicitly adopted—criticisms of the neoclassical view of a
perfectly efficient economic market, defenders of the metaphor have
not yet responded—as their economist counterparts have—by
adopting a view of the “marketplace” that takes into account the
existence of transaction costs and the institutions that mediate them.
The New Institutional First Amendment described here attempts to
do just that. In essence, it argues that if the marketplace of ideas is the
animating purpose of the First Amendment, it can be served by
institutions as well as by individuals.

over two written dissents—later dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted. Kasky, 539 U.S.
at 655 (2003) (majority opinion); id. at 665 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
289. Coase, supra note 5, at 8.
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But there is another bit of internecine conflict the New
Institutional First Amendment could help resolve: the discord among
the First Amendment’s doctrinal categories. These familiar
categories—commercial speech, government speech, schoolhouse
speech, and so on—increasingly overlap with one another and lack
any intrinsic meaning.290 The institutions that originally gave rise to
these categories no longer limit themselves to the roles with which
they are traditionally associated and which the doctrines arose to
address. Schools and government units, for example, increasingly
291
enter into naming rights deals with commercial sponsors. How
should such speech acts be defined, and what level of First
Amendment protection should they receive? Are they commercial
speech, government speech, the school’s speech, or something else
entirely? And what principle justifies the result?
The New Institutional First Amendment helps to resolve these
and other difficulties, by dusting off and partially rehabilitating the
marketplace metaphor that has animated First Amendment
jurisprudence since at least 1919, albeit with increasing shakiness.
Differentiating between speech institutions may not always be an
easy task, but it is no more difficult—and is quite a bit more useful—
than the line-drawing courts must attempt under the contemporary
“categorization” approach.
The New Institutional First Amendment is not simply
explanatory; it is also predictive and normative. As such, its vitality
will be tested by the increasing number of “speech institutions”
demanding the Court’s attention. In addition to the thorny problem
of commercial speech, which may well be the next big thing in First
292
Amendment law, many of the Court’s looming First Amendment
293
issues—copyright, scientific speech, and speech in the electoral
294
sphere, for example—would benefit from the institutional approach.
Online speech presents perhaps the most interesting challenge, as the
internet replaces the traditional press (long regarded as a prototypical

290. See generally Blocher, supra note 179 (arguing that the First Amendment categories of
government speech, commercial speech, and schoolhouse speech have collapsed upon each
other).
291. Id. at 6–16.
292. See supra notes 183–91 and accompanying text.
293. See Schauer, supra note 124, at 1799.
294. Schauer, supra note 121, at 92 n.42 (citing C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and
Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 24–28 (1998)).

01__BLOCHER.DOC

2008]

4/16/2008 8:29:05 AM

NEW INSTITUTIONAL FIRST AMENDMENT

889
295

“speech institution”) as the dominant forum for public debate. The
New Institutional First Amendment, unlike many free speech
theories, is able to capture and explain the unique, exchangeenhancing nature of the Internet and suggest why that special role
might entitle it to special institutional treatment.
As it becomes “increasingly possible and likely . . . that
Americans can go about their daily lives without entering the public
296
fora cordoned off for strong First Amendment protection,” private
institutions’ regulation of speech has become increasingly important.
The New Institutional First Amendment recognizes, as economists
have for decades, that individuals create and live under an
institutional regime.

295.

SCOTT GANT, WE’RE ALL JOURNALISTS NOW: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRESS
(2007).
296. Note, Unsolicited Communications, supra note 21, at 1322; see also id. at 1328 (“The
privatization of traditionally public space is a straightforward threat to the marketplace of
ideas.”).
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